



ENTRUST CERTIFICATE SERVICES

Certification Practice Statement

For Private Trust Certificates

Version: 2.8
17 November 2025

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Revision History

Issue	Date	Changes in this Revision
1.0	December 1, 2013	Initial version.
1.1	March 4, 2014	Addition of mobile device certificates and change to Loss Limitations
1.2	February 17, 2015	Correct CA Public Key distribution and add new SHA-2 issuing CA
1.3	February 12, 2016	Update for Subscriber Obligations and HSM criteria
1.4	March 7, 2016	Update to allow SHA-1 signed certificates and update approved key sizes
1.5	September 19, 2016	Update to remove restriction for SHA-1 signed Private SSL certificates
1.6	February 1, 2017	Changes to Definitions, Disclaimers, Loss Limitations and Conflict of Provisions
1.7	July 14, 2017	Update for domain validation methods, inclusion of IP address validation methods and no stipulation for CAA and CT
1.8	February 1, 2018	Added requirements for Shared and Dedicated CAs for Private SSL
2.0	June 30, 2019	Upgrade CPS to RFC 3647 format
2.1	September 30, 2020	Update Entrust brand, email address for CPR, implementation as applicable from CAB Forum ballots (23, 24, 25, 28, 30, 31 33, and 35), change mobile device certificate validity period, and removal of non-inclusive language
2.2	September 30, 2021	Update for Private Key Compromise and Business & Legal matters
2.3	September 30, 2022	Update Entrust Ottawa address, CAB Forum ballots (SC51, SC53), remove CA Administrators, define separation of duties, role of trademarks, Mozilla policy 2.7.2, and self-audit
2.4	January 31, 2023	Add IDN practice, address illegal activities, update CA list
2.5	May 12, 2023	Policy Authority and Enterprise RA updates and alignment with public CPS
2.6	February 20, 2024	ACME domain verification update
2.7	January 15, 2025	CPR reporting methods, CAB Forum ballots SC-73, SC-75
2.8	November 17, 2025	Include Client Authentication certificates, remove references to CAB Forum BRs and NetSec documents, minimize “shall” statements

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1. Introduction

The Entrust CAs issue Certificates, which include the following Certificate Types:

- Private SSL Certificate(s)
- Mobile Device Certificate(s)
- Client Authentication Certificate(s)

1.1 Overview

This CPS describes the practices and procedures of (i) the CAs, and (ii) RAs operating under the CAs. This CPS also describes the terms and conditions under which Entrust makes CA and RA services available in respect to Certificates. This CPS is applicable to all persons, entities, and organizations, including, all Applicants, Subscribers, Relying Parties, Resellers, Co-marketers and any other persons, entities, or organizations that have a relationship with (i) Entrust in respect to Certificates and/or any services provided by Entrust in respect to Certificates, or (ii) any RAs operating under a CAs, or any Resellers or Co-marketers providing any services in respect to Certificates. This CPS is incorporated by reference into all Certificates issued by Entrust CAs listed in §1.3.1. This CPS provides Applicants, Subscribers, Relying Parties, Resellers, Co-marketers and other persons, entities, and organizations with a statement of the practices and policies of the CAs and also of the RAs operating under the CAs. This CPS also provides a statement of the rights and obligations of Entrust, any third parties that are operating RAs under the CAs, Applicants, Subscribers, Relying Parties, Resellers, Co-marketers and any other persons, entities, or organizations that may use or rely on Certificates or have a relationship with a CA or a RA operating under a CA in respect to Certificates and/or any services in respect to Certificates.

1.2 Document Name and Identification

This document is called the Entrust Certificate Services Certification Practice Statement for Private Trust Certificates.

1.3 PKI Participants

1.3.1 Certification Authorities

In the Entrust public-key infrastructure, CAs may accept Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs) and Public Keys from Applicants whose identity has been verified as provided herein by an RA. If a Certificate Application is verified, the verifying RA will send a request to a CA for the issuance of a Certificate. The CA will create a Certificate containing the Public Key and identification information contained in the request sent by the RA to that CA. The Certificate created in response to the request will be digitally signed by the CA.

This CPS covers all Certificates issued and signed by the following Shared CAs. This CPS also covers all Certificates issued and signed by Dedicated CAs; however, the Dedicated CAs are not listed for privacy reasons.

Root

CN: [Entrust Root Certification Authority - G3](#)

Subject Key Identifier: b57501ee41c7ca7a3ff2fc5a56c776060b066c66

Thumbprint (SHA-1): ae8569d94f4ab1c464ad9b7cfd7840b0e39daf66

Subordinate CA(s)

CN: [Entrust Certification Authority - L1H](#)

Subject Key identifier: 90915cfb528ff4fbbb373e03ff39631ea0691b81

CN: [Entrust Certification Authority – PrivSSL1](#)

Subject Key identifier: 63266b9530c1a8201083325162296262db7ea4d7

Root

CN: Entrust 4K Private TLS Root CA - 2022
Subject Key Identifier: dd1adb235f00ee1989276d1210f0c8143329ccc2
Thumbprint (SHA-1): b8bd2bb0af6e55f61478dc852961c07f200036e4

Subordinate CA(s)

CN: Entrust Private TLS Certification Authority - PrivTLS1
Subject Key Identifier: a4f626d81868bc199b69241e76260edac7b4c8e8

Root

CN: [Entrust 4K Client Root CA - 2024](#)
Subject Key Identifier: 143879fbb5583b6138f45de28b32a7a507e27507
SHA256 fingerprint:
621A840CDEECFDDDB20B2528E5E8AE5CBA6D2FDC23020BC7BA04FA90F54833D74

Subordinate CA(s)

CN: [Entrust 4K Client CA - CLIENT1](#)
Subject Key Identifier: 4775f09cf5bd101d755b9ef38c855733a535330d

Root

CN: [Entrust P384 Client Root CA - 2024](#)
Subject Key Identifier: 6c79bdf09e30965cd682d370eb693e60cffe314
SHA256 fingerprint:
481F0E1B0874D84B189FF83A694D27B30ECD2A477AB3289E976C7FA1A6BD255B

Subordinate CA(s)

CN: [Entrust P384 Client CA - CLIENT2](#)
Subject Key Identifier: 1b21f09cad08d0c57561b429c4df2a77815cac2

1.3.2 Registration Authorities

RAs under the CA may accept Certificate Applications from Applicants and perform verification of the information contained in such Certificate Applications, according to the procedures established by the Policy Authority. A RA operating under a CA may send a request to such CA to issue a Certificate to the Applicant.

Only RAs authorized by Entrust are permitted to submit requests to a CA for the issuance of Certificates.

The CA may designate an Enterprise RA to verify Certificate requests from the Enterprise RA's own organization or from an organization of which the Enterprise RA is an agent. The requested FQDNs must be within the Enterprise RA's domain namespace.

1.3.3 Subscribers

Subscribers may use CA services to support transactions and communications. The Subject of a Certificate is the party named in the Certificate. A Subscriber, as used herein, may refer to both the Subject of the Certificate and the entity that contracted with the CA for the Certificate's issuance. Prior to verification of identity and issuance of a Certificate, a Subscriber is an Applicant.

1.3.4 Relying Parties

A Relying Party is a person, entity, or organization that relies on or uses a Certificate and/or any other information provided in a Repository to verify the identity and Public Key of a Subscriber and/or use such Public Key to send or receive encrypted communications to or from a Subscriber.

1.3.5 Other Participants

No stipulation.

1.4 Certificate Usage

Private SSL Certificates are issued to organizations to allow servers, devices and individuals to identify themselves to entities and services of the organization for authorization.

Private SSL Certificates may be issued from a Shared CA to multiple related or unrelated Subscribers. Certificates issued from a Shared CA may unintentionally be trusted by unrelated Subscribers.

Private SSL Certificates may be issued from a Dedicated CA to a single Subscriber.

There may be policy differences between a Shared CA and a Dedicated CA, which will be indicated in this CPS.

1.4.1 Appropriate Certificate Uses

This CPS is applicable to the following Certificate Types.

Private SSL Certificates

Private SSL Certificates are intended for use in establishing web-based data communication conduits via TLS/SSL protocols. Private SSL Certificates conform to the requirements of the ITU-T X.509 v3 standard. The primary purpose of a Private SSL Certificate is to facilitate the exchange of encryption keys in order to enable the encrypted communication of information over the Internet between the user of an Internet browser and a secure server.

Mobile Device Certificates

Mobile Device Certificates are intended to allow the identification of mobile devices. Mobile Device Certificates conform to the requirements of the ITU-T X.509 v3 standard. The primary purpose of a Mobile Device Certificate is to provide a trusted identity to a service to obtain authorization to use that service.

Client Authentication Certificates

Client Authentication Certificates are intended for use in establishing client authentication via TLS/SSL protocols. Client Authentication Certificates conform to the requirements of the ITU-T X.509 v3 standard. The primary purpose of Client Authentication Certificates is to authenticate the identity of a client (such as a user or device) to a server.

1.4.2 Prohibited Certificate Uses

The use of all Certificates issued by the CA shall be for lawful purposes and consistent with applicable laws, including without limitation, applicable export or import laws.

Certificates and the services provided by Entrust in respect to Certificates are not designed, manufactured, or intended for use in or in conjunction with any application in which failure could lead to death, personal injury or severe physical or property damage, including the monitoring, operation or control of nuclear facilities, mass transit systems, aircraft navigation or communications systems, air traffic control, weapons systems, medical devices or direct life support machines, and all such uses are prohibited.

1.5 Policy Administration

1.5.1 Organization Administering the Document

The CPS is administered by the Policy Authority.

1.5.2 Contact Person

The contact information for questions about Certificates is:

Entrust Limited
2500 Solandt Road, Suite 100
Ottawa, Ontario

Canada K2K 3G5
Attn: Entrust Certificate Services

Tel: 1-866-267-9297 or 1-613-270-2680
Email: support@entrust.com

1.5.3 Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy

The Policy Authority determines the suitability and applicability of this CPS.

1.5.4 CPS Approval Procedures

This CPS and any subsequent changes shall be approved by the Entrust Policy Management Authority.

1.6 Definitions and Acronyms

1.6.1 Definitions

Affiliate: means with respect to Entrust, a person or entity that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, is controlled by or is under common control with Entrust, and, with respect to any other party, any corporation or other entity that is directly or indirectly controlled by that party. In this context, a party “controls” a corporation or another entity if it directly or indirectly owns or controls fifty percent (50%) or more of the voting rights for the board of directors or other mechanism of control or, in the case of a non-corporate entity, an equivalent interest.

Applicant: means a person, entity, or organization applying for a Certificate, but which has not yet been issued a Certificate, or a person, entity, or organization that currently has a Certificate or Certificates and that is applying for renewal of such Certificate or Certificates or for an additional Certificate or Certificates.

Business Day: means any day, other than a Saturday, Sunday, statutory or civic holiday in the City of Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.

Certificate: means a digital document issued by the CA that, at a minimum: (a) identifies the CA issuing it, (b) names or otherwise identifies a Subject, (c) contains a Public Key of a Key Pair, (d) identifies its Operational Period, and (e) contains a serial number and is digitally signed by a CA. Certificate includes the following Certificate types issued by the CA: Private SSL Certificates, Mobile Device Certificates, and Client Authentication Certificates.

Certificate Application: means the form and application information requested by an RA operating under a CA and submitted by an Applicant when applying for the issuance of a Certificate.

Certificate Beneficiaries: means, collectively, all

Relying Parties that actually rely on such Certificate during the Operational Period of such Certificate.

Certificate Problem Report: complaint of suspected Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse, or inappropriate conduct related to Certificates..

Certificate Requester: means an employee or agent authorized to request a Certificate for an organization.

Certificate Revocation List: means a time-stamped list of the serial numbers of revoked Certificates that have been digitally signed by a CA.

Certification Authority: means a certification authority operated by or on behalf of Entrust for the purpose of issuing, managing, revoking, renewing, and providing access to Certificates. The CA (i) creates and digitally signs Certificates that contain among other things a Subject’s Public Key and other information that is intended to identify the Subject, (ii) makes Certificates available to facilitate communication with the Subject identified in the Certificate, and (iii) creates and digitally signs Certificate Revocation Lists

containing information about Certificates that have been revoked and which should no longer be used or relied upon.

Certification Authority Authorization: has the meaning given in RFC 8659.

Certification Practice Statement: means this document which is a statement of the practices that the CA uses in issuing, managing, revoking, renewing, and providing access to Certificates, and the terms and conditions under which the CA makes such services available.

Client Authentication Certificate: means a Certificate issued to authenticate clients to servers and does not include the serverAuth extended key usage.

Co-marketers: means any person, entity, or organization that has been granted by Entrust or an RA operating under a CA the right to promote Certificates.

Compromise: means a suspected or actual loss, disclosure, or loss of control over sensitive information or data.

Cross Certificate(s): means a Certificate(s) that (i) includes the Public Key of a Public-Private Key Pair generated by a Certification Authority; and (ii) includes the digital signature of a Root CA.

Dedicated CA: means a CA which is dedicated to one Subscriber. The CA hierarchy is trusted by a Root CA which is also dedicated to the same Subscriber.

Domain Contact: the Domain Name Registrant, technical contact, or administrative contact (or the equivalent under a ccTLD) as listed in the WHOIS record of the Base Domain Name or in a DNS SOA record, or as obtained through direct contact with the Domain Name Registrar.

Enterprise RA: an employee or agent of an organization unaffiliated with the CA who authorizes issuance of Certificates to that organization.

Entrust: means Entrust Limited.

Entrust Group: means, collectively Entrust, its Affiliates, its licensors (including for the avoidance of any doubt Microsoft), its resellers, its suppliers, its co-marketers, its subcontractors, its distributors and the directors, officers, employees, agents and independent contractors of any of them.

Entrust Group Affiliates: Collectively, Entrust Limited and its Affiliates.

FIPS: means the Federal Information Processing Standards. These are U.S. Federal standards that prescribe specific performance requirements, practices, formats, communication protocols, and other requirements for hardware, software, data, and telecommunications operation.

Fully-Qualified Domain Name: a domain name that includes the domain labels of all superior nodes in the Internet domain name system.

IETF: means the Internet Engineering Task Force. The Internet Engineering Task Force is an international community of network designers, operators, vendors, and researchers concerned with the evolution of the Internet architecture and the efficient operation of the Internet.

IP Address: a 32-bit or 128-bit number assigned to a device that uses the Internet Protocol for communication.

Issuing CA: In relation to a particular Certificate, the CA that issued the Certificate. This could be either a Root CA or a Subordinate CA.

Key Compromise: a Private Key is said to be compromised if its value has been disclosed to an unauthorized person, or an unauthorized person has had access to it.

Key Pair: means two mathematically related cryptographic keys, having the properties that (i) one key can be used to encrypt a message that can only be decrypted using the other key, and (ii) even knowing one key, it is believed to be computationally infeasible to discover the other key.

Linting: a process in which the content of digitally signed data such as a Certificate, Certificate Revocation List, or OCSP response, or data-to-be signed object such as a tbsCertificate (as described in RFC 5280, Section 4.1.1.1) is checked for conformance with the profiles and requirements.

Mobile Device Certificate: means a Certificate issued by a Certification Authority for use to identify a mobile device.

Object Identifier: means a specially-formatted sequence of numbers that is registered in accordance with internationally-recognized procedures for object identifier registration.

Operational Period: means, with respect to a Certificate, the period of its validity. The Operational Period would typically begin on the date the Certificate is issued (or such later date as specified in the Certificate), and ends on the date and time it expires as noted in the Certificate or earlier if the Certificate is Revoked.

Parent Company: a company that Controls a Subsidiary Company.

Policy Authority: means those personnel who work for or on behalf of Entrust and who are responsible for determining the policies and procedures that govern the operation of the CAs.

Private Key: means the key of a Key Pair used to decrypt an encrypted message. This key must be kept secret.

Private SSL Certificate: means an SSL Certificate issued by a Certification Authority for use on secure servers. The Certification Authority Root CA Certificate is not distributed to any application software vendor for public trust. The Private SSL Certificate may contain domain names which are not publicly registered.

Public Key: means the key of a Key Pair used to encrypt a message. The Public Key can be made freely available to anyone who may want to send encrypted messages to the holder of the Private Key of the Key Pair. The Public Key is usually made publicly available in a Certificate issued by a CA and is often obtained by accessing a repository or database. A Public Key is used to encrypt a message that can only be decrypted by the holder of the corresponding Private Key.

Registration Authority: means an entity that performs two functions: (1) the receipt of information from a Subject to be named in a Certificate, and (2) the performance of verification of information provided by the Subject following the procedures prescribed by the CAs. In the event that the information provided by a Subject satisfies the criteria defined by the CAs, an RA may send a request to a CA requesting that the CA generate, digitally sign, and issue a Certificate containing the information verified by the RA. An RA may be operated by Entrust or by an independent third-party.

Reliable Data Source: an identification document or source of data used to verify Subject Identity Information that is generally recognized among commercial enterprises and governments as reliable, and which was created by a third party for a purpose other than the Applicant obtaining a Certificate.

Relying Party: means a person, entity, or organization that relies on or uses a Certificate and/or any other information provided in a Repository under a CA to obtain and confirm the Public Key and identity of a Subscriber.

Relying Party Agreement: means the agreement between a Relying Party and Entrust or between a Relying Party and an independent third-party RA or Reseller under a CA in respect to the provision and use of certain information and services in respect to Certificates.

Repository: means a collection of databases and web sites that contain information about Certificates issued by a CA including among other things, the types of Certificates and services provided by the CA, fees for the Certificates and services provided by the CA, Certificate Revocation Lists, OCSP responses, descriptions of the practices and procedures of the CA, and other information and agreements that are intended to govern the use of Certificates issued by the CA.

Resellers: means any person, entity, or organization that has been granted by Entrust or an RA operating under a CA the right to license the right to use Certificates.

Reserved IP Address: an IPv4 or IPv6 address that is contained in the address block of any entry in either of the following IANA registries:

- <https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-specialregistry.xhtml>
- <https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv6-special-registry/iana-ipv6-specialregistry.xhtml>

Revoke or Revocation: means, with respect to a Certificate, to prematurely end the Operational Period of that Certificate from a specified time forward.

Root CA: mean the top level CAs listed in §1.3.1.

Shared CA: means a CA which issues Certificates to one or more Subscribers.

Subordinate CA: means collectively, the subordinate CAs listed in §1.3.1. and/or Third Party Subordinate CAs.

Subordinate CA Certificate: means a Certificate that (i) includes the Public Key of a Public-Private Key Pair generated by a certification authority; and (ii) includes the digital signature of a Root CA or Subordinate CA.

Subject: means the person, entity, organization or device identified in the “Subject” field in a Certificate.

Subscriber: means a person, entity, or organization that has applied for and has been issued a Certificate.

Subscriber Agreement: means the agreement between a Subscriber and Entrust (or an Affiliate of Entrust) or between a Subscriber and an independent third-party RA or Reseller under a CA in respect to the issuance, management, and provision of access to a Certificate and the provision of other services in respect to such Certificate. The Subscriber Agreement may consist of one or more parts.

Subsidiary Company: a company that is controlled by a Parent Company.

Third Party Subordinate CA: means a certification authority owned by a third party which has been issued a Subordinate CA Certificate.

Trusted Role: an employee or contractor of a CA who has authorized access to any component of CA Infrastructure.

Wildcard Domain Name: a Certificate containing at least one Wildcard Domain Name in the Subject Alternative Names in the Certificate.

1.6.2 Acronyms

CA	Certification Authority
CAA	Certification Authority Authorization
CPR	Certificate Problem Report
CPS	Certification Practice Statement
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CSR	Certificate Signing Request
DBA	Doing Business As
DN	Distinguished Name
DNS	Domain Name System
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
EKU	Extended Key Usage
FIPS	(US Government) Federal Information Processing Standard
FQDN	Fully Qualified Domain Name
HTTP	Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
HTTPS	Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
ITU-T	International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication Standardization Sector
NIST	(US Government) National Institute of Standards and Technology
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
OID	Object Identifier
PA	Policy Authority
PIN	Personal Identification Number

PKI	Public-Key Infrastructure
RA	Registration Authority
RFC	Request for Comment
RSA	Rivest–Shamir–Adleman cryptosystem
SAN	Subject Alternative Name
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
TLS	Transport Layer Security
URL	Universal Resource Locator

2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities

Entrust maintains the Repository to store various information related to Certificates and the operation of the CAs and RAs. The CPS and various other related information is published in the Repository.

2.1 Repositories

The CAs maintain the Repositories to allow access to Certificate-related and Certificate revocation information. The information in the Repositories is accessible through a web interface, available on a 24x7 basis and is periodically updated as set forth in this CPS. The Repositories are the only approved source for CRL and other information about Certificates.

The CA will adhere to the latest version of the CPS published in the Repository.

The Repository can be accessed at <https://www.entrust.net/CPS>.

2.2 Publication of Certification Information

The CA publishes its CPS, CA Certificates, Subscriber Agreements, Relying Party Agreements, and CRLs in the Repositories. This CPS is structured in the RFC3647 format.

2.3 Time or Frequency of Publications

The CPS will be re-issued and published at least once per year.

CRLs will be updated as per §4.9.7.

OCSP responses will be updated as per §4.9.10.

2.4 Access Controls on Repositories

Information published in the Repository is public information. Read only access is unrestricted. The CAs have implemented logical and physical controls to prevent unauthorized write access to its Repositories. Historic versions of the CPS are maintained in the Repository in the archive folder.

3. Identification and Authentication

The Policy Authority mandates the verification practices for verifying identification and authentication, and may, in its discretion, update such practices.

3.1 Naming

Before issuing a Certificate, the CAs ensure that all Subject organization information in the Certificate conforms to the requirements of, and has been verified in accordance with the procedures prescribed in this CPS and matches the information confirmed and documented by the RA pursuant to its verification processes.

3.1.1 Types of Names

The Subject names in a Certificate comply with the X.501 Distinguished Name (DN) form. The CAs use a single naming convention as set forth below.

Private SSL Certificates

- (i) “Country Name” (C) which is the two-letter ISO 3166 code for the country in which the Applicant is located and plans to host the secure server on which the Applicant is intending to install the Private SSL Certificate;
- (ii) “Organization Name” (O) which is the name of the organization in the case of a corporation, partnership, or other entity. In the case of a sole proprietorship, the organization name can be the name of the Applicant;
- (iii) “Organizational Unit Name” (OU) which is an optional field. The OU field may be used to distinguish between different organizational groups within an organization (for example, to distinguish between human resources, marketing, and development);
- (iv) “Common Name” (CN) which is the fully qualified hostname or path used in the DNS of the secure server on which the Applicant is intending to install the Private SSL Certificate;
- (v) “State” (ST), which is the state or province of the organization’s place of business, if applicable; and
- (vi) “Subject Alternative Name” (SAN), which is the fully qualified hostname or path used in the DNS of the secure server on which the Applicant is intending to install the Private SSL Certificate. There may be multiple SANs in each Private SSL Certificate.

Mobile Device Certificates

- (i) “Country Name” (C) which is the two-letter ISO 3166 code for the country in which the Applicant is located;
- (ii) “Organization Name” (O) which is the name of the organization in the case of a corporation, partnership, or other entity. In the case of a sole proprietorship, the organization name can be the name of the Applicant;
- (iii) “Organizational Unit Name” (OU) which is an optional field. The OU field may be used to distinguish between different organizational groups within an organization (for example, to distinguish between human resources, marketing, and development);
- (iv) “Common Name” (CN) which is a unique alpha-numeric identifier, Subscriber name, or a unique alpha-numeric identifier plus Subscriber name which has been approved by the Subscriber administration contact; and
- (v) Optionally, “Subject Alternative Name” (SAN) which is the email address of the Subscriber.

Client Authentication (OV) Certificates

- (i) “Country Name” (C) which is the two-letter ISO 3166 code for the of the Subscriber;
- (ii) “Organization Name” (O) which is the name of the organization in the case of a corporation, partnership, or other entity;
- (iii) “Common Name” (CN) which is the hostname, the fully qualified hostname or path used in the DNS of the secure server;
- (iv) “Locality” (L), which is the city or locality of the organization’s place of business; and
- (v) “State” (ST) (if applicable), which is the state or province of the organization’s place of business.

Client Authentication (EV) Certificates

Same as Client Authentication (OV) Certificates, with the following additions or exceptions:

- (i) “Organization Name” (O) which is the name of the organization and may include the DBA/tradename;
- (ii) “serialNumber” which is the registration number of Subscriber,
- (iii) “businessCategory” which is the applicable business category clause per the EV SSL Guidelines,
- (iv) “jurisdictionOfIncorporationLocalityName” (if applicable) which is the jurisdiction of registration or incorporation locality of Subscriber,
- (v) “jurisdictionOfIncorporationStateOrProvinceName” (if applicable) which is the jurisdiction of registration or incorporation state or province of Subscriber, and
- (vi) “jurisdictionOfIncorporationCountry” which is the jurisdiction of registration or incorporation country of Subscriber.

3.1.2 Need for Names to be Meaningful

The Certificates issued pursuant to this CPS are meaningful only if the names that appear in the Certificates can be understood and used by Relying Parties. Names used in the Certificates must identify the person or object to which they are assigned in a meaningful way. CAs will not issue Certificates to the Subscribers that contain domain names, IP Addresses, DN, URL, and/or e-mail addresses that the Subscribers do not legitimately own or control. Examples of fields and extensions where these names appear include subject DN and subject alternative names.

3.1.3 Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers

No stipulation.

3.1.4 Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms

International Domain Names (IDNs) will be verified and represented in the commonName and subjectAltName using Punycode.

3.1.5 Uniqueness of Names

Names are defined unambiguously for each Subject in a Repository. The Distinguished Name attribute is to be unique to the Subject to which it is issued.

3.1.6 Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks

Subscribers should not request Certificates with any content that infringes on the intellectual property rights of another entity. Unless otherwise specifically stated in this CPS, Entrust does not verify an Applicant’s right to use a trademark and does not resolve trademark disputes. Entrust may reject any application or require revocation of any Certificate that is part of a trademark dispute.

3.2 Initial Identity Validation

3.2.1 Method to Prove Possession of Private Key

For Key Pairs generated by the Applicant, the CAs perform proof of possession tests for CSRs created using reversible asymmetric algorithms (such as RSA) by validating the signature on the CSR submitted by the Applicant with the Certificate Application.

3.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity

3.2.2.1 Identity

Private SSL Certificates (Shared CA), Mobile Device Certificates and Client Authentication Certificates.

The CA or the RA performs verification of any organizational identities that are submitted by an Applicant or Subscriber in accordance with the practices mandated by the Policy Authority. The CA or the RA determines whether the organizational identity, address, and domain name provided with a Certificate Application are consistent with information contained in third-party databases and/or governmental sources. The information and sources used for the verification of Certificate Applications may vary depending on the jurisdiction of the Applicant or Subscriber.

In the case of organizational identities that are not registered with any governmental sources, the CA or the RA uses commercially reasonable efforts to confirm the existence of the organization. Such commercially reasonable efforts may include site visits or third-party attestation letter.

Private SSL Certificates (Dedicated CA)

RAs operating under the Dedicated CAs are not required to confirm any organization identities that are submitted by an Applicant or Subscriber.

3.2.2.2 DBA/Tradename

No stipulation.

3.2.2.3 Verification of Country

Verification of country will be done in accordance with the methods of § 3.2.2.1.

3.2.2.4 Validation of Domain Authorization or Control

3.2.2.4.1 Fully-Qualified Domain Names

Private SSL Certificates (Dedicated CA)

RAs operating under the Dedicated CAs are not required to confirm the Applicant or Subscriber has control of the FQDN to be included in the Private SSL Certificate.

Private SSL Certificates (Shared CA)

The CA will confirm that prior to issuance, the CA or the RA validated each Fully-Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) listed in the OV or EV TLS Certificate using at least one of the methods listed below.

Completed validations of Applicant authority may be used for the issuance of multiple Certificates over time. For purposes of domain validation, the term Applicant includes the Applicant's Parent Company, Subsidiary Company, or Affiliate.

The CA maintains a record of which domain validation method was used to validate every domain.

3.2.2.4.1.1 Email, Fax, SMS, or Postal Mail to Domain Contact

Confirm the Applicant's control over the FQDN by sending a Random Value via email, fax, SMS, or postal mail and then receiving a confirming response utilizing the Random Value. The Random Value must be sent to an email address, fax/SMS number, or postal mail address identified as a Domain Contact.

Each email, fax, SMS, or postal mail may confirm control of multiple ADNs.

The CA or RA may send the email, fax, SMS, or postal mail identified under this section to more than one recipient provided that every recipient is identified by the Domain Name Registrar as representing the Domain Name Registrant for every FQDN being verified using the email, fax, SMS, or postal mail.

The Random Value is unique in each email, fax, SMS, or postal mail.

The CA or RA may resend the email, fax, SMS, or postal mail in its entirety, including re-use of the Random Value, provided that the communication's entire contents and recipient(s) remain unchanged.

The Random Value will remain valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

3.2.2.4.1.2 Constructed Email to Domain Contact

Confirm the Applicant's control over the FQDN by (i) sending an email to one or more addresses created by using 'admin', 'administrator', 'webmaster', 'hostmaster', or 'postmaster' as the local part, followed by the at-sign ("@"), followed by an ADN, (ii) including a Random Value in the email, and (iii) receiving a confirming response utilizing the Random Value.

Each email may confirm control of multiple FQDNs, provided the ADN used in the email is an ADN for each FQDN being confirmed.

The Random Value shall be unique in each email.

The email may be re-sent in its entirety, including the re-use of the Random Value, provided that its entire contents and recipient shall remain unchanged.

The Random Value shall remain valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

3.2.2.4.1.3 DNS Change

Confirm the Applicant's control over the FQDN by confirming the presence of a Random Value in a DNS CNAME, TXT or CAA record for an ADN or an ADN that is prefixed with a Domain Label that begins with an underscore character.

If a Random Value is used, the CA or RA shall provide a Random Value unique to the Certificate request and shall not use the Random Value after (i) 30 days or (ii) if the Applicant submitted the Certificate request, the timeframe permitted for reuse of validated information relevant to the Certificate.

3.2.2.4.1.4 IP Address

Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by confirming that the Applicant controls an IP Address returned from a DNS lookup for A or AAAA records for the FQDN in accordance with § 3.2.2.5.

Once the FQDN has been validated using this method, the CA does not issue Certificates for FQDNs for higher level domain levels that end in the validated FQDN unless the CA performs a separate validation for that FQDN using an authorized method. This method not used for validating Wildcard Domain Names.

3.2.2.4.1.5 Email to DNS CAA Contact

Confirm the Applicant's control over the FQDN by sending a Random Value via email and then receiving a confirming response utilizing the Random Value. The Random Value will be sent to a DNS CAA Email Contact. The relevant CAA Resource Record Set will be found using the search algorithm defined in RFC 8659 Section 3.

Each email may confirm control of multiple FQDNs, provided that each email address is a DNS CAA Email Contact for each ADN Name being validated. The same email may be sent to multiple recipients as long as all recipients are the DNS CAA Email Contacts for each ADN being validated.

The Random Value shall be unique in each email. The email may be re-sent in its entirety, including the reuse of the Random Value, provided that its entire contents and recipient(s) remain unchanged. The Random Value shall remain valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

3.2.2.4.1.6 Email to DNS TXT Contact

Confirm the Applicant's control over the FQDN by sending a Random Value via email and then receiving a confirming response utilizing the Random Value. The Random Value will be sent to a DNS TXT Record Email Contact for the ADN selected to validate the FQDN.

Each email may confirm control of multiple FQDNs, provided that each email address is DNS TXT Record Email Contact for each ADN being validated. The same email may be sent to multiple recipients as long as all recipients are the DNS TXT Record Email Contacts for each ADN being validated.

The Random Value shall be unique in each email. The email may be re-sent in its entirety, including the reuse of the Random Value, provided that its entire contents and recipient(s) remain unchanged. The Random Value shall remain valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

3.2.2.4.1.7 Phone with Domain Contact

Confirm the Applicant's control over the FQDN by calling the Domain Contact's phone number and obtain a confirming response to validate the ADN. Each phone call may confirm control of multiple ADNs provided that the same Domain Contact phone number is listed for each ADN being verified and they provide a confirming response for each ADN.

In the event that someone other than a Domain Contact is reached, the CA may request to be transferred to the Domain Contact.

In the event of reaching voicemail, the CA may leave the Random Value and the ADN(s) being validated. The Random Value must be returned to the CA to approve the request.

The Random Value shall remain valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

3.2.2.4.1.8 Phone Contact with DNS TXT Record Phone Contact

Confirm the Applicant's control over the FQDN by calling the DNS TXT Record Phone Contact's phone number and obtain a confirming response to validate the ADN. Each phone call may confirm control of multiple ADNs provided that the same DNS TXT Record Phone Contact phone number is listed for each ADN being verified and they provide a confirming response for each ADN.

The CA may not knowingly be transferred or request to be transferred as this phone number has been specifically listed for the purposes of domain validation.

In the event of reaching voicemail, the CA may leave the Random Value and the ADN(s) being validated. The Random Value must be returned to the CA to approve the request.

The Random Value shall remain valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

3.2.2.4.1.9 Phone Contact with DNS CAA Phone Contact

Confirm the Applicant's control over the FQDN by calling the DNS CAA Phone Contact's phone number and obtain a confirming response to validate the ADN. Each phone call may confirm control of multiple ADNs provided that the same DNS CAA Phone Contact phone number is listed for each ADN being verified and they provide a confirming response for each ADN. The relevant CAA Resource Record Set must be found using the search algorithm defined in RFC 8659 Section 3.

The CA may not knowingly be transferred or request to be transferred as this phone number has been specifically listed for the purposes of domain validation.

In the event of reaching voicemail, the CA may leave the Random Value and the ADN(s) being validated. The Random Value must be returned to the CA to approve the request.

The Random Value shall remain valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

3.2.2.4.1.10 Agreed Upon Change to Website v2

Confirm the Applicant's control over the FQDN by verifying that the Request Token or Random Value is contained in the contents of a file.

- (i) The entire Request Token or Random Value must not appear in the request used to retrieve the file, and
- (ii) the CA MUST receive a successful HTTP response from the request (meaning a 2xx HTTP status code must be received).

The file containing the Request Token or Random Number:

- (iii) Must be located on the Authorization Domain Name, and
- (iv) Must be located under the `"/.well-known/pki-validation"` directory, and
- (v) Must be retrieved via either the `"http"` or `"https"` scheme, and
- (vi) Must be accessed over an Authorized Port.

The CA follows redirects and the following apply:

- (vii) Redirects must be initiated at the HTTP protocol layer. Redirects will only be the result of a 301, 302, or 307 HTTP status code response, as defined in RFC 7231, Section 6.4, or a 308 HTTP status code response, as defined in RFC 7538, Section 3. Redirects must be to the final value of the Location HTTP response header, as defined in RFC 7231, Section 7.1.2
- (viii) Redirects must be to resource URLs with either via the `"http"` or `"https"` scheme.
- (ix) Redirects must be to resource URLs accessed via Authorized Ports.

If a Random Value is used, then:

- (x) The CA must provide a Random Value unique to the certificate request.
- (xi) The Random Value must remain valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation. The CPS MAY specify a shorter validity period for Random Values, in which case the CA must follow its CPS.

Note: Once the FQDN has been validated using this method, the CA does not issue Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the Domain Labels of the validated FQDN. This method is not used for validating Wildcard Domain Names.

3.2.2.4.1.11 Agreed Upon Change to Website - ACME

Confirming the Applicant's control over a FQDN by validating domain control of the FQDN using the ACME HTTP Challenge method defined in Section 8.3 of RFC 8555. The following are additive requirements to RFC 8555.

The CA receives a successful HTTP response from the request (meaning a 2xx HTTP status code is received).

The token (as defined in RFC 8555, Section 8.3) is not used for more than 30 days from its creation.

If the CA follows redirects, the following apply:

- (i) Redirects are initiated at the HTTP protocol layer. Redirects will be the result of a 301, 302, or 307 HTTP status code response, as defined in RFC 7231, Section 6.4, or a 308 HTTP status code response, as defined in RFC 7538, Section 3. Redirects must be to the final value of the Location HTTP response header, as defined in RFC 7231, Section 7.1.2.
- (ii) Redirects must be to resource URLs with either the `"http"` or `"https"` scheme.
- (iii) Redirects must be to resource URLs accessed via Authorized Ports.

Note: The CA will not issue Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the labels of the validated FQDN unless the CA performs a separate validation for that FQDN using an authorized method. This method is not used for validating Wildcard Domain Names.

3.2.2.4.1.12 Authentication of an IP Address

This section defines the permitted processes and procedures for validating the Applicant's ownership or control of an IP Address listed in a Certificate.

The CA will confirm that prior to issuance, the CA has validated each IP Address listed in the Certificate using at least one of the methods specified in this section.

Completed validations of Applicant authority may be valid for the issuance of multiple Certificates over time. In all cases, the validation must have been initiated within the time period specified in §4.2.1.2 prior to Certificate issuance. For purposes of IP Address validation, the term Applicant includes the Applicant's Parent Company, Subsidiary Company, or Affiliate.

CAs will maintain a record of which IP Address validation method, including the relevant Baseline Requirements version number, was used to validate every IP Address.

3.2.2.4.2 Non-Fully-Qualified Domain Names

RAs operating under the CAs allow non-FQDN to be used.

Private SSL Certificates (Shared CA)

Non-FQDNs must be multi-label name or reserved IP Address. Each non-FQDN is reserved for one Subscriber for each CA used to issue Private SSL Certificates.

Private SSL Certificates (Dedicated CA)

Non-FQDNs may be minimum single-label or a reserved IP Address.

3.2.2.5 Authentication of an IP Address

Private SSL Certificates may use registered or Reserved IP Addresses.

RAs operating under the CAs use one of the methods defined in Section 3.2.2.5 of the Baseline Requirements to confirm the Applicant or Subscriber has control of the registered IP Address to be included in the Certificate.

Private SSL Certificates (Shared CA)

Reserved IP Addresses must be reserved for one Subscriber for each Shared CA used to issue Private SSL Certificates.

3.2.2.6 Wildcard Validation

No stipulation.

3.2.2.7 Data Source Accuracy

Prior to using any data source as a Reliable Data Source, the RA evaluates the source for its reliability, accuracy, and resistance to alteration or falsification.

3.2.2.8 CAA Records

No stipulation.

3.2.2.9 Authentication of Email Address

No stipulation.

3.2.2.10 Authentication of Registered Trademark

No stipulation.

3.2.3 Authentication of Individual Identity

The CA or RA will use the methods set out below to verify any individual identities that are submitted by an Applicant or Subscriber.

An individual identity will be verified by using a legible copy, which discernibly shows the Applicant's face, of at least one currently valid government-issued photo ID (passport, driver's license, military ID, national ID, or equivalent document type). The copy is inspected for any indication of alteration or falsification.

The Applicant's address will be verified using a trusted form of identification such as a government ID, utility bill, or bank or credit card statement. The same government-issued ID that was used to verify the Applicant's name may be relied upon.

The request is verified by contacting the Applicant using a reliable method of communication.

3.2.4 Non-verified Subscriber Information

Non-verified Subscriber information may be organization identities per §3.2.2.1, non-FQDNs per §3.2.2.4.2 or Reserved IP Addresses per §3.2.2.5.

3.2.5 Validation of Authority

If the Applicant for a Certificate containing subject identity information is an organization, the CA or RA will use a reliable method of communication to verify the authority and approval of the Applicant Representative to:

- (i) to act as an Enterprise RA;
- (ii) to request issuance or revocation of Certificates; or
- (iii) to assign responsibilities to others to act in these roles.

The RA may use the sources listed in §3.2.2.1 to verify the reliable method of communication. Provided that the RA uses a reliable method of communication, the RA may establish the authenticity of the Certificate request directly with the Applicant representative or with an authoritative source within the Applicant's organization, such as the Applicant's main business offices, corporate offices, human resource offices, information technology offices, or other departments that the RA deems appropriate.

The CA allows a Subscriber to specify the individuals who may request Certificates and will not accept any Certificate requests that are outside this specification. The CAs will provide a Subscriber with a list of its authorized individuals upon the Subscriber's verified written request.

3.2.6 Criteria for Interoperation

No stipulation.

3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests

3.3.1 Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-key

Each Certificate contains a Certificate expiration date. The reason for having an expiration date for a Certificate is to minimize the exposure of the Key Pair associated with the Certificate. For this reason, when processing a new Certificate Application, the CA recommends that a new Key Pair be generated and that the new Public Key of this Key Pair be submitted with the Applicant's Certificate Application. If a Subscriber wishes to continue to use a Certificate beyond the expiry date for the current Certificate, the Subscriber must obtain a new Certificate and replace the Certificate that is about to expire. Subscribers submitting a new Certificate Application will be required to complete the initial application process, as described in §4.1. The RA may reuse documents and data provided in §3.2 to verify Certificate information per §4.2.1.

The RA that processed the Subscriber's Certificate Application makes a commercially reasonable effort to notify Subscribers of the pending expiration of their Certificate by sending an email to the technical contact listed in the corresponding Certificate Application. Upon expiration of a Certificate, the Subscriber should

immediately cease using such Certificate and remove such Certificate from any devices and/or software in which it has been installed.

The Subscriber may request a replacement Certificate using an existing Key Pair.

3.3.2 Identification and Authentication for Re-key after Revocation

The CAs do not renew Certificates that have been revoked. If a Subscriber wishes to use a Certificate after revocation, the Subscriber must apply for a new Certificate and replace the Certificate that has been revoked. In order to obtain another Certificate, the Subscriber is required to complete the initial application process, as described in §4.1. Upon revocation of a Certificate, the Subscriber should immediately cease using such Certificate and remove such Certificate from any devices and/or software in which it has been installed.

3.4 Identification and Authentication for Revocation Requests

A Subscriber may request revocation of their Certificate at any time provided that the CA can validate the Subscriber is the person, organization, or entity to whom the Certificate was issued. The CA will authenticate a request from a Subscriber for revocation of their Certificate by authenticating the Subscriber or confirming authorization of the Subscriber through a reliable method of communication. Upon receipt and confirmation of such information, the CA will then process the revocation request as stipulated in §4.9.

An Enterprise RA may use multi-factor authentication to request revocation of a Certificate.

4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

4.1 Certificate Application

To obtain a Certificate, an Applicant must:

- (i) generate a secure and cryptographically sound Key Pair, if not generated by a CA
- (ii) agree to all of the terms and conditions of the CPS and the Subscriber Agreement, and
- (iii) complete and submit a Certificate Application, providing all information requested by an RA without any errors, misrepresentation, or omissions.

Upon an Applicant's completion of the Certificate Application and acceptance of the terms and conditions of this CPS and the Subscriber Agreement, an RA follows the procedures described in §3.2 to perform verification of the information contained in the Certificate Application. If the verification performed by an RA is successful, the RA may, in its sole discretion, request the issuance to the Applicant of a Certificate from a CA.

4.1.1 Who Can Submit a Certificate Application

Either the Applicant or an individual authorized to request Certificates on behalf of the Applicant may submit Certificate requests. Applicants are responsible for any data that the Applicant or an agent of the Applicant supplies to the RA.

4.1.2 Enrollment Process and Responsibilities

The CAs require each Applicant to submit a Certificate request and application information prior to issuing a Certificate. The CAs or RAs authenticates all communication from an Applicant and protects communication from modification.

Applicants request a Certificate by completing the request forms online. Applicants are solely responsible for submitting a complete and accurate Certificate request for each Certificate.

The enrollment process includes:

- (i) Agreeing to the applicable Subscriber Agreement,
- (ii) Paying any applicable fees,
- (iii) Submitting a complete Certificate application,
- (iv) Generating a Key Pair, and
- (v) Delivering the Public Key of the Key Pair to the CA.

4.2 Certificate Application Processing

4.2.1 Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

The CAs and RAs may use the documents and data provided in §3.2 to verify Certificate information or may reuse previous validations themselves provided the data or documentation was obtained from a source specified under §3.2 or completed the validation itself no more than 825 days after such data or documentation was validated.

4.2.2 Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications

No stipulation.

4.2.3 Time to Process Certificate Applications

No stipulation.

4.2.4 Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Records

No stipulation.

4.3 Certificate Issuance

After performing verification of the information provided by an Applicant with a Certificate Application, an RA operating under a CA may request that a CA issue a Certificate. Upon receipt of a request from an RA operating under a CA, the CA may generate and digitally sign a Certificate in accordance with the Certificate profile described in §7. An Enterprise RA can approve issuance of Certificates and submit the certificate request to an RA.

4.3.1 CA Actions During Certificate Issuance

4.3.1.1 Manual Authorization of Certificate Issuance for Root CAs

Certificate issuance by the Root CA requires at least two individuals authorized by the CA (i.e. the CA system operator, system officer, or PKI administrator), where one will deliberately issue a direct command in order for the Root CA to perform a certificate signing operation.

Roots CA Private Keys will not sign Subscriber Certificates.

4.3.1.2 Issuance of Subscriber Certificate

The CA will not issue Certificates with validity period that exceeds the validity period of the corresponding Root CA Certificate. The CA will not backdate the notBefore date of a Subscriber Certificate.

The CA enforces multi-factor authentication for all accounts capable of causing certificate issuance or performing Registration Authority. In addition, the CA implements technical controls operated to restrict issuance of Private SSL Certificates through accounts which are limited to a set of pre-approved domains.

4.3.1.3 Linting of To-be-signed Certificate Content

No stipulation.

4.3.1.4 Linting of Issued Certificates

The CA may use a Linting process to test Certificates.

4.3.2 Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate

Once a Certificate has been generated and placed in a Repository, the RA that requested the issuance of the Certificate uses commercially reasonable efforts to notify the Applicant by email that the Applicant's Certificate is available. The email may contain a URL for use by the Applicant to retrieve the Certificate.

4.4 Certificate Acceptance

4.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance

No stipulation.

4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA

No stipulation.

4.4.3 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

No stipulation.

4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage

4.5.1 Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage

Subscriber shall conform to §9.6.3.

4.5.2 Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage

Relying Parties shall conform to §9.6.4.

4.6 Certificate Renewal

4.6.1 Circumstance for Certificate Renewal

CAs or RAs may provide a Certificate lifecycle monitoring service which will support Certificate renewal.

4.6.2 Who May Request Renewal

Subjects, Subscribers or Subscriber agents may request renewal of Certificates.

4.6.3 Processing Certificate Renewal Requests

CAs or RAs will process Certificate renewal requests with validated verification data. Previous verification data may be used as specified in §4.2.1.

Certificates may be renewed using the previously accepted Public Key, if the Public Key meets the key size requirements of §6.1.5.

4.6.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

CAs or RAs will provide Certificate renewal notification to the Subscriber or Subscriber agents through an Internet link or by email.

Subscribers or Subscriber agents may request that email renewal notices are not sent for their expiring Certificates.

4.6.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate

No stipulation.

4.6.6 Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA

CAs or RAs will provide the Subscriber with a Certificate through an Internet link.

4.6.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

No stipulation.

4.7 Certificate Re-key

4.7.1 Circumstance for Certificate Re-key

No stipulation.

4.7.2 Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key

No stipulation.

4.7.3 Processing Certificate Re-keying Requests

No stipulation.

4.7.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

No stipulation.

4.7.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-keyed Certificate

No stipulation.

4.7.6 Publication of the Re-keyed Certificate by the CA

No stipulation.

4.7.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

No stipulation.

4.8 Certificate Modification**4.8.1 Circumstance for Certificate Modification**

No stipulation.

4.8.2 Who May Request Certificate Modification

No stipulation.

4.8.3 Processing Certificate Modification Requests

No stipulation.

4.8.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

No stipulation.

4.8.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate

No stipulation.

4.8.6 Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA

No stipulation.

4.8.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

No stipulation.

4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension

The CA revokes a Certificate after receiving a valid revocation request from an RA operating under such CA. An RA operating under a CA is entitled to request and may request that a CA revoke a Certificate after such RA receives a valid revocation request from the Subscriber for such Certificate. An RA operating under a CA is entitled to request and shall request that a CA revoke a Certificate if such RA becomes aware of the occurrence of any event that would require a Subscriber to cease to use such Certificate.

CAs do not support the suspension of Certificates.

4.9.1 Circumstances for Revocation**4.9.1.1 Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate**

The CA is entitled to revoke and may revoke, and an RA operating under a CA is entitled to request revocation of and shall request revocation of, a Subscriber's Certificate if the CA or RA has knowledge of or a reasonable basis for believing that any of the events listed in this section have occurred.

The CA may revoke a Certificate if one or more of the following occurs:

- (i) The Subscriber requests in writing that the CA revoke the Certificate;
- (ii) The Subscriber notifies the CA that the original Certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization;
- (iii) The CA obtains evidence that the Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise;

- (iv) The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can easily compute the Subscriber's Private Key based on the Public Key in the Certificate (such as a Debian weak key, see <https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys>);
- (v) The CA obtains evidence that the validation of the domain authorization or control for any FQDN or IP Address in the Certificate should not be relied upon.
- (vi) The Certificate no longer complies with the requirements of §6.1.5 and §6.1.6;
- (vii) The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;
- (viii) The CA is made aware that a Subscriber has violated one or more of its material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement;
- (ix) The CA is made aware of any circumstance indicating that use of a FQDN or IP Address in the Certificate is no longer legally permitted (e.g. a court or arbitrator has revoked a Domain Name Registrant's right to use the Domain Name, a relevant licensing or services agreement between the Domain Name Registrant and the Applicant has terminated, or the Domain Name Registrant has failed to renew the Domain Name);
- (x) The CA is made aware that a Certificate with a Wildcard Domain Name has been used to authenticate a fraudulently misleading subordinate FQDN;
- (xi) The CA is made aware of a material change in the information contained in the Certificate;
- (xii) The CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with this CPS;
- (xiii) The CA determines that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate;
- (xiv) Revocation is required by any other section in this CPS;
- (xv) The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Subscriber's Private Key to compromise or if there is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed;
- (xvi) The technical content or format of the Certificate presents an unacceptable risk to Relying Parties;
- (xvii) A Certificate is used to digitally sign hostile code, including spyware or other malicious software (malware); or
- (xviii) Any other reason that may be reasonably expected to affect the integrity, security, or trustworthiness of a Certificate or CA.

4.9.1.2 Reasons for Revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate

The Issuing CA may revoke a Subordinate CA Certificate within seven (7) days if one or more of the following occurs:

- (i) The Subordinate CA requests revocation in writing;
- (ii) The Subordinate CA notifies the Issuing CA that the original Certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization;
- (iii) The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Subordinate CA's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise or no longer complies with the requirements of §6.1.5 and §6.1.6,
- (iv) The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;
- (v) The Issuing CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with or that Subordinate CA has not complied with this CPS;
- (vi) The Issuing CA determines that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate or misleading;
- (vii) The Issuing CA or Subordinate CA ceases operations for any reason and has not made arrangements for another CA to provide revocation support for the Certificate; or
- (viii) Revocation is required by the Issuing CA's CPS.

4.9.2 Who Can Request Revocation

CAs, RAs and Subscribers may initiate revocation.

A Subscriber or another appropriately authorized party (such as an Enterprise RA) may request revocation of their Certificate at any time for any reason. If a Subscriber requests revocation of their Certificate, the Subscriber must be able to validate themselves as set forth in §3.4 to the RA that processed the Subscriber's

Certificate Application. The CAs are not required to revoke and the RAs operating under the CAs are not required to request revocation of a Certificate until a Subscriber can properly validate themselves as set forth in §4.9.3. A CA is entitled to revoke and will revoke, and an RA operating under a CA is entitled to request revocation of and shall request revocation of, a Subscriber's Certificate at any time for any of the reasons set forth in §4.9.1.

Subscribers, Relying Parties, anti-malware organizations and other third parties may submit Certificate Problem Reports informing the CA of a reasonable cause to revoke the Certificate.

4.9.3 Procedure for Revocation Request

A Subscriber shall request revocation of their Certificate if the Subscriber has a suspicion or knowledge of or a reasonable basis for believing that any of the following events have occurred:

- (i) Compromise of the Subscriber's Private Key;
- (ii) Knowledge that the original Certificate request was not authorized and such authorization will not be retroactively granted;
- (iii) Change in the information contained in the Subscriber's Certificate;
- (iv) Change in circumstances that cause the information contained in Subscriber's Certificate to become inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading.

A Subscriber request for revocation of their Certificate may be verified by (i) Subscriber authentication credentials, or (ii) authorization of the Subscriber through a reliable method of communication.

If a Subscriber's Certificate is revoked for any reason, the Subscriber will be notified by sending an email to the technical and security contacts listed in the Certificate Application. Revocation of a Certificate does not affect any of the Subscriber's contractual obligations under this CPS, the Subscriber's Subscriber Agreement, or any Relying Party Agreements.

Subscribers, Relying Parties, Anti-Malware Organizations and other third parties may submit a CPR by notification through the contact information specified in §1.5.2.

4.9.4 Revocation Request Grace Period

In the case of Private Key Compromise, or suspected Private Key Compromise, a Subscriber shall request revocation of the corresponding Certificate immediately upon detection of the Compromise or suspected Compromise. Revocation requests for other required reasons should be made as soon as reasonably practicable.

4.9.5 Time within Which CA Must Process the Revocation Request

No stipulation.

4.9.6 Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties

A Relying Party should check whether the Certificate that the Relying Party wishes to rely on has been revoked. A Relying Party should check the Certificate Revocation Lists maintained in the appropriate Repository or perform an on-line revocation status check using OCSP to determine whether the Certificate that the Relying Party wishes to rely on has been revoked. In no event will the Entrust Group be liable for any damages whatsoever due to (i) the failure of a Relying Party to check for revocation or expiration of a Certificate, or (ii) any reliance by a Relying Party on a Certificate that has been revoked or that has expired.

4.9.7 CRL Issuance Frequency

The CAs issue CRLs as follows:

- (i) CRLs for Certificates issued to Subordinate CAs are issued at least once every twelve months or with 24 hours after revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate. The next CRL update will not be more than twelve months from the last update.

- (ii) CRLs for Subscriber Certificates are issued at least once every 24 hours. The CRL validity interval is not more than 10 days.

4.9.8 Maximum Latency for CRLs

No stipulation.

4.9.9 On-line Revocation/Status Checking Availability

On-line revocation/status checking of Certificates is available on a continuous basis by CRL or On-line Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP).

OCSP responses are signed by the CA or an OCSP responder whose Certificate is signed by the CA that issued the Certificate whose revocation status is being checked. The OCSP signing Certificate contains an extension of type id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck, as defined by RFC6960.

4.9.10 On-line Revocation Checking Requirements

The CAs support an OCSP capability using the GET method as described in RFC6960 for Certificates issued in accordance with this CPS.

The CAs sign and make available OCSP as follows:

- (i) OCSP responses for Certificates issued to Subordinate CAs are issued at least once every twelve months or within 24 hours after revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate.
- (ii) OCSP responses for Subscriber Certificates are issued at least once every 24 hours. OCSP responses will have a validity interval of not more than 10 days.

The on-line locations of the CRL and the OCSP response are included in the Certificate to support software applications that perform automatic Certificate status checking.

4.9.11 Other Forms of revocation Advertisements Available

No stipulation.

4.9.12 Special Requirements Re Key Compromise

If a Subscriber suspects or knows that the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key contained in the Subscriber's Certificate has been Compromised, the Subscriber shall immediately notify the RA that processed the Subscriber's Certificate Application, using the procedures set forth in §3.4, of such suspected or actual Compromise. The Subscriber shall immediately stop using such Certificate and shall remove such Certificate from any devices and/or software in which such Certificate has been installed. The Subscriber shall be responsible for investigating the circumstances of such Compromise or suspected Compromise and for notifying any Relying Parties that may have been affected by such Compromise or suspected Compromise.

Subscribers, Relying Parties, Anti-Malware Organizations and other third parties may advise Entrust of a Private Key Compromise using one of the following demonstration methods:

- (i) Submission of a signed CSR with a common name of "Proof of Key Compromise for Entrust", or
- (ii) Submission of a Private Key.

4.9.13 Circumstances for Suspension

The Repository will not include entries that indicate that a Certificate has been suspended.

4.9.14 Who Can Request Suspension

Not applicable.

4.9.15 Procedure for Suspension Request

Not applicable.

4.9.16 Limits on Suspension Period

Not applicable.

4.10 Certificate Status Services**4.10.1 Operational Characteristics**Private SSL and Client Authentication Certificates

Revocation entries on a CRL or OCSP response are not removed until after the expiry date of the revoked Certificate.

4.10.2 Service Availability

The CA operates and maintains its CRL and OCSP capability with resources sufficient to provide a response time of ten seconds or less under normal operating conditions.

The CA maintains an online 24x7 Repository that application software can use to automatically check the current status of all unexpired Certificates issued by the CA.

4.10.3 Optional Features

No stipulation.

4.11 End of Subscription

No stipulation.

4.12 Key Escrow and Recovery**4.12.1 Key Escrow and Recovery Policy Practices**

No stipulation.

4.12.2 Session Key Encapsulation and Recovery Policy and Practices

No stipulation.

5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls

5.1 Physical Security Controls

5.1.1 Site Location and Construction

The computing facilities that host the CA services are located in Ottawa, Canada. The CA equipment is located in a security zone that is physically separated from Entrust's other systems to restrict access to personnel in Trusted Roles. The security zone is constructed with privacy and slab-to-slab wire mesh. The security zone is protected by electronic control access systems, alarmed doors and is monitored via a 24x7 recorded security camera and motion detector system.

5.1.2 Physical Access

The room containing the CA software is designated a two (2) person zone, and controls are used to prevent a person from being in the room alone. Alarm systems are used to notify security personnel of any violation of the rules for access to a CA.

5.1.3 Power and Air Conditioning

The Security zone is equipped with:

- Filtered, conditioned, power connected to an appropriately sized UPS and generator;
- Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning appropriate for a commercial data processing facility; and
- Emergency lighting.

The environmental controls conform to local standards and are appropriately secured to prevent unauthorized access and/or tampering with the equipment. Temperature control alarms and alerts are activated upon detection of threatening temperature conditions.

5.1.4 Water Exposures

No liquid, gas, exhaust, etc. pipes traverse the controlled space other than those directly required for the area's HVAC system and for the pre-action fire suppression system. Water pipes for the pre-action fire suppression system are only filled on the activation of multiple fire alarms.

5.1.5 Fire Prevention and Protection

The CA facility is fully wired for fire detection, alarm and suppression. Routine, frequent inspections of all systems are made to assure adequate operation.

5.1.6 Media Storage

All media is stored away from sources of heat and from obvious sources of water or other obvious hazards. Electromagnetic media (e.g. tapes) are stored away from obvious sources of strong magnetic fields. Archived material is stored in a room separate from the CA equipment until it is transferred to the archive storage facility.

5.1.7 Waste Disposal

Waste is removed or destroyed in accordance with industry best practice. Media used to store sensitive data is destroyed, such that the information is unrecoverable, prior to disposal.

5.1.8 Off-site Backup

As stipulated in §5.5.

5.2 Procedural Controls

5.2.1 Trusted Roles

The CAs have a number of Trusted Roles for sensitive operations of the CA software.

5.2.2 Number of Persons Required per Task

CA operations related to changing CA policy settings require more than one person with a Trusted Role to perform the operation.

The CA Private Keys are backed up and recovered only by personnel in Trusted Roles using dual control in a physically secured environment.

5.2.3 Identification and Authentication for Each Role

Personnel in Trusted Roles must undergo background investigations and must be trained for their specific role.

5.2.4 Roles Requiring Separation of Duties

Roles requiring a separation of duties include those performing:

- (i) Authorization functions such as the verification of information in Certificate applications and approvals of Certificate applications and revocation requests,
- (ii) Certificate revocation,
- (iii) Backups, recording, and record keeping functions;
- (iv) Audit, review, oversight, or reconciliation functions; and
- (v) Duties related to CA key management or administration.

5.3 Personnel Controls

Operational personnel for a CA will not be assigned other responsibilities that conflict with their operational responsibilities for the CA. The privileges assigned to operational personnel for a CA will be limited to the minimum required to carry out their assigned duties.

5.3.1 Qualifications, Experience and Clearance Requirements

Prior to the engagement of any person in the Certificate management process, the CA or RA will verify the identity and trustworthiness of such person.

5.3.2 Background Check Procedures

No stipulation.

5.3.3 Training Requirements

Personnel in Trusted Roles and Validation Specialists are provided skills-training which is based on industry requirements.

Validation Specialists to perform information verification duties with skills-training that covers basic PKI knowledge, authentication and vetting policies and procedures (including this CPS), and common threats to the information verification process (including phishing and other social engineering tactics).

Validation Specialists receive skills-training prior to commencing their job role and are required to pass an examination on the applicable information verification requirements. The CA maintains records of such training and ensures that personnel entrusted with Validation Specialist duties maintain an appropriate skill level.

5.3.4 Retraining Frequency and Requirements

CAs and RAs provide refresher training and informational updates sufficient to ensure that all personnel in Trusted Roles retain the requisite degree of expertise.

5.3.5 Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence

No stipulation.

5.3.6 Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions

No stipulation.

5.3.7 Independent Contractor Requirements

Third Party RAs personnel involved in the issuance of a Certificate shall meet the training and skills requirements of §5.3.3 and the document retention and event logging requirements of §5.4.1.

5.3.8 Documentation Supplied to Personnel

No stipulation.

5.4 Audit Logging Procedures

Significant security events in the CAs are automatically time-stamped and recorded as audit logs in audit trail files. The audit trail files are processed (reviewed for policy violations or other significant events) on a regular basis. Audit trail files are archived periodically. All files including the latest audit trail file are moved to backup media and stored in a secure archive facility.

The time for the CAs computer systems is synchronized with the service provided by the National Research Council Canada.

5.4.1 Types of Events Recorded

The CAs and all RAs operating under a CA record in detail every action taken to process a Certificate request and to issue a Certificate, including all information generated or received in connection with a Certificate request, and every action taken to process the Request, including time, date, and personnel involved in the action.

The foregoing record requirements include, but are not limited to, an obligation to record the following events:

- (i) CA Certificate key lifecycle events, including:
 - a. Key generation, backup, storage, recovery, archival, and destruction;
 - b. Certificate requests, renewal and re-key requests, and revocation;
 - c. Approval and rejection of Certificate requests;
 - d. Cryptographic device lifecycle management events;
 - e. Generation of CRLs
 - f. Signing of OCSP responses; and
 - g. Introduction of new Certificate profiles and retirement of existing Certificate profiles.
- (ii) Subscriber Certificate lifecycle management events, including:
 - h. Certificate requests, renewal and re-key requests, and revocation;
 - i. All verification activities required by this CPS;
 - j. Approval and rejection of Certificate requests;
 - k. Issuance of Certificates; and
 - l. Generation of CRLs
 - m. Signing of OCSP responses.
- (iii) Security events, including:
 - n. Successful and unsuccessful PKI system access attempts;
 - o. PKI and security system actions performed;
 - p. Security profile changes;
 - q. System crashes, hardware failures, and other anomalies;
 - r. Firewall and router activities; and
 - s. Entries to and exits from the CA facility.

Log entries include the following elements:

- t. Date and time of event;
- u. Identity of the person making the journal record; and
- v. Description of event.

5.4.2 Frequency of Processing Log

No stipulation

5.4.3 Retention Period for Audit Log

The CA will retain for at least two years:

- (i) CA Certificate and key lifecycle management event records, as set forth in §5.4.1(i), after either: the destruction of the CA key, or the revocation or expiration of the CA Certificate, whichever occurs later;
- (ii) Subscriber Certificate lifecycle management event records, as set forth in §5.4.1(ii), after the expiration of the Subscriber Certificate; and
- (iii) Any security event records, as set forth in §5.4.1(iii), after the event occurred.

5.4.4 Protection of Audit Log

No stipulation.

5.4.5 Audit Log Backup Procedures

No stipulation.

5.4.6 Audit Collection System

No stipulation.

5.4.7 Notification to Event-causing Subject

No stipulation.

5.4.8 Vulnerability Assessments

CAs annually perform a risk assessment that:

- (i) Identifies foreseeable internal and external threats that could result in unauthorized access, disclosure, misuse, alteration, or destruction of any Certificate data or Certificate management processes;
- (ii) Assesses the likelihood and potential damage of these threats, taking into consideration the sensitivity of the Certificate data and Certificate management processes; and
- (iii) Assesses the sufficiency of the policies, procedures, information systems, technology, and other arrangements that the CA has in place to counter such threats.

Based on the risk assessment, a security plan is developed, implemented, and maintained consisting of security procedures, measures, and products designed to achieve the objectives set forth above and to manage and control the risks identified during the risk assessment. The security plan includes administrative, organizational, technical, and physical safeguards appropriate to the sensitivity of the Certificate data and Certificate management processes. The security plan also takes into account then-available technology and the cost of implementing the specific measures, and implements a reasonable level of security appropriate to the harm that might result from a breach of security and the nature of the data to be protected.

5.5 Records Archival

5.5.1 Types of Records Archived

The audit trail files, databases and revocation information for the CAs are archived.

5.5.2 Retention Period of for Archive

The CA will retain all documentation relating to Certificate requests and the verification thereof, and all Certificates and revocation thereof, for at least two years after any Certificate based on that documentation ceases to be valid.

5.5.3 Protection of Archive

The databases for CAs are protected by encryption. The archive media is protected through storage in a restricted-access facility to which only Entrust-authorized personnel have access. Archive files are backed up as they are created. Originals are stored on-site and housed with a CA system. Backup files are stored at a secure and separate geographic location.

5.5.4 Archive Backup Procedures

No stipulation.

5.5.5 Requirements for Time-stamping of Records

No stipulation.

5.5.6 Archive Collection System

No stipulation.

5.5.7 Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information

No stipulation.

5.6 Key Changeover

CAs' Key Pairs will be retired from service at the end of their respective lifetimes as defined in §6.3. New CA Key Pairs will be created as required to support the continuation of CA Services. Each CA will continue to publish CRLs signed with the original Key Pair until all Certificates issued using that original Key Pair have expired. The CA key changeover process will be performed such that it causes minimal disruption to Subscribers and Relying Parties.

5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery

5.7.1 Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures

CAs have a security incident response plan, a disaster recovery plan, and a business continuity plan to provide for timely recovery of services in the event of a security incident, breach of security, loss of system integrity, or system outage.

They address the following:

- (i) the conditions for activating the plans;
- (ii) resumption procedures;
- (iii) a maintenance schedule for the plan;
- (iv) awareness and education requirements;
- (v) the responsibilities of the individuals;
- (vi) recovery point objective (RPO) of fifteen minutes;
- (vii) recovery time objective (RTO) of 24 hours for essential CA operations which include Certificate revocation, and issuance of Certificate revocation status; and
- (viii) testing of recovery plans.

In order to mitigate the event of a disaster, the CAs have implemented the following:

- (ix) secure on-site and off-site storage of backup HSMS containing copies of all CA Private Keys
- (x) secure on-site and off-site storage of all requisite activation materials
- (xi) regular synchronization of critical data to the disaster recovery site
- (xii) regular incremental and daily backups of critical data within the primary site
- (xiii) environmental controls as described in §5.1
- (xiv) high availability architecture for critical systems

Entrust has policies and procedures that will be employed in the event of such a Compromise. At a minimum, all Subscribers will be informed as soon as practicable of such a Compromise and information will be posted in the Repository.

5.7.2 Computing Resources, Software and/or Data are Corrupted

No stipulation.

5.7.3 Entity Private Key Compromise Procedures

No stipulation.

5.7.4 Business Continuity Capabilities after a Disaster

No stipulation.

5.8 CA or RA Termination

In the event that a CA ceases operation, all Certificates issued by such CA will be revoked and the CRL lifetime will be set to a period that meets any Entrust obligations.

6. Technical Security Controls

6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation

6.1.1 Key Pair Generation

6.1.1.1 CA Key Pair Generation

The CAs will perform the following when generating a CA Key Pair:

- (i) Prepare and follow a Key Pair generation script;
- (ii) Have a qualified auditor witness the CA Key Pair generation process;
- (iii) Have a qualified auditor issue a report opining that the CA followed its CA Key Pair generation ceremony during its key generation process and the controls to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the CA Key Pair;
- (iv) Generate the CA Key Pair in a physically secured environment;
- (v) Generate the CA Key Pair using personnel in Trusted Roles under the principles of multiple person control and split knowledge;
- (vi) Generate the CA Key Pair within cryptographic modules meeting the applicable requirements of §6.2.11;
- (vii) Log its CA Key Pair generation activities; and
- (viii) Maintain effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the Private Key was generated and protected in conformance with the procedures described in this CPS and (if applicable) its CA Key Pair generation script.

6.1.1.2 RA Key Pair Generation

No stipulation.

6.1.1.3 Subscriber Key Pair Generation

The Applicant or Subscriber is required to generate or initiate a new, secure, and cryptographically sound Key Pair to be used in association with the Subscriber's Certificate or Applicant's Certificate Application.

The CAs will reject a Certificate request if one or more of the following conditions are met:

- (i) The Key Pair does not meet the requirements set forth in §6.1.5 and/or §6.1.6;
- (ii) There is clear evidence that the specific method used to have generate the Private Key was flawed;
- (iii) The CA is aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Private Key to compromise;
- (iv) The CA has previously been notified that the Private Key has suffered a Key Compromise, using the of CA's procedure for revocation request as described in §4.9.3 and §4.9.12;
- (v) The CA is aware of a demonstrated or proven method to easily compute the Private Key based on the Public Key.

6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Subscriber

CAs do not generate, archive or deliver the Key Pair on behalf of the Subscriber.

6.1.3 Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

The Public Key to be included in a Certificate is delivered to the CA in a signed Certificate Signing Request (CSR) as part of the Certificate Application process. The signature on the CSR will be verified by the CA prior to issuing the Certificate.

6.1.4 CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties

The Certification Authority Certificate(s) containing the Root CAs Public Key are made available to Subscribers with the Certificate or may be obtained from the Entrust support team. The Subordinate CA Certificate is provided to the Subscriber with the Certificate.

The Subordinate CA Certificate for the CA is provided to the Relying Parties by the Subscriber.

6.1.5 Key Sizes

For CA and Subscriber Certificates, the key sizes supported are:

- (i) RSA 2048-bit, 3072 bit and 4096-bit
- (ii) Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) NIST P-256 and P-384

6.1.6 Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking

For RSA Public Keys, CAs will confirm that the value of the public exponent is an odd number equal to 3 or more. Additionally, the public exponent will be in the range between $2^{16}+1$ and $2^{256}-1$. The modulus will also have the following characteristics: an odd number, not the power of a prime, and have no factors smaller than 752.

For ECC Public Keys, CAs will confirm the validity of all keys using either the ECC Full Public Key Validation Routine or the ECC Partial Public Key Validation Routine.

6.1.7 Key Usage Purposes

Root CA Private Keys must not be used to sign Certificates except in the following cases:

- (i) Self-signed Certificates to represent the Root CA itself;
- (ii) Certificates for Subordinate CAs and Cross Certificates;
- (iii) Certificates for infrastructure purposes (e.g. administrative role certificates, internal CA operational device certificates, and OCSP Response verification Certificates); and
- (iv) Certificates issued solely for the purpose of testing products with Certificates issued by a Root CA.

6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

The CAs have implemented physical and logical safeguards to prevent unauthorized Certificate issuance. Protection of the CA Private Key outside the validated system consists of physical security, encryption, or a combination of both, implemented in a manner that prevents disclosure of the CA Private Key. The CA encrypts its Private Key with an algorithm and key-length that are capable of withstanding cryptanalytic attacks for the residual life of the encrypted key.

6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls

CA Private Keys must be stored and protected on cryptographic modules that meet or exceed the requirements as defined in §6.2.11. Private Keys on cryptographic modules are held in secure facilities under two-person control. RA Private Keys must be stored and protected on cryptographic modules that meet or exceed the requirements defined in §6.2.11.

6.2.2 Private Key (N out of M) Multi-person Control

A minimum of two-person control will be established on any CA Private Key for all purposes including activation and backup and may be implemented as a combination of technical and procedural controls. Persons involved in management and use of the CA Private Keys will be designated as authorized by the CA for this purpose. The names of the parties used for two-person control will be maintained on a controlled list.

6.2.3 Private Key Escrow

Entrust does not escrow the CAs' Private Keys.

6.2.4 Private Key Backup

CA Private Keys

CA Private Keys are backed up under the two-person control used to create the original version of the Private Keys. All copies of the CA Private Key are securely protected.

Subscriber Private Keys

Subscribers are responsible for protecting the Private Key associated with the Public Key in the Subscriber's Certificate.

6.2.5 Private Key Archival

No stipulation.

6.2.6 Private Key Transfer into or from Cryptographic Module

CA Private Keys are generated by and secured in a cryptographic module. In the event that a Private Key is to be transported from one cryptographic module to another, the Private Key must be migrated using the secure methodology supported by the cryptographic module.

If the Private Key of a Subordinate CA is communicated to an unauthorized third party, then the Subordinate CA will revoke all Certificates corresponding to Private Key.

6.2.7 Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module

CA Private Keys are stored on a cryptographic module are secured in cryptographic module as defined in §6.2.11.

6.2.8 Method of Activating Private Key

CA Private Keys

CA Private Keys are activated under two-person control using the methodology provided with the cryptographic module.

Subscriber Private Keys

Subscriber Private Keys are activated by the Subscriber to meet the requirements of the security software used for their applications. Subscribers shall protect their Private Keys corresponding to the requirements in §9.6.3.

6.2.9 Method of Deactivating Private Key

CA Private Keys

CA Private Keys will be deactivated when the CA is not required for active use. Deactivation of the Private Keys will be done in accordance with the methodology provided with the cryptographic module.

6.2.10 Method of Destroying Private Key

CA Private Keys

CA Private Keys destruction will be two-person controlled and may be accomplished by executing a "zeroize" command or by destruction of the cryptographic module. Destruction of CA Private Keys must be authorized by the Policy Authority.

If the CA is removing a cryptographic module from service, then all Private Keys must be removed from the module. If the CA cryptographic module intended to provide tamper-evident characteristics is removed from service, then the device will be destroyed.

6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating

CA Key Pairs

CA Key Pairs must be generated and protected on a cryptographic module that is compliant to at least FIPS 140-2 Level 3, FIPS 140-3 Level 3, or an appropriate Common Criteria Protection Profile or Security Target, EAL 4 (or higher), which includes requirements to protect the Private Key and other assets against known threats.

6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management

6.3.1 Public Key Archival

No stipulation.

6.3.2 Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods

CA Key Pairs

CA 2048-bit RSA Key Pairs may have a validity period expiring no later than 31 December 2030.

Private SSL Certificates

Private SSL Certificates contain a validity period of up to, but no more than, 39 months.

Mobile Device Certificates

Mobile Device Certificates contain a validity period of up to, but no more than, 120 months. Effective 1 September 2020, the validity period may be no more than 60 months.

Client Authentication Certificates

Client Authentication Certificates may have a validity period of up to, but no more than, 398-days.

6.4 Activation Data

6.4.1 Activation Data Generation and Installation

No stipulation.

6.4.2 Activation Data Protection

No stipulation.

6.4.3 Other Aspects of Activation Data

No stipulation.

6.5 Computer Security Controls

6.5.1 Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements

The workstations on which the CAs operate are physically secured as described in §5.1. The operating systems on the workstations on which the CAs operate enforce identification and authentication of users. Access to CA software databases and audit trails is restricted as described in this CPS. All operational personnel that are authorized to have access to the CAs are required to use hardware tokens in conjunction with a PIN to gain access to the physical room that contains the CA software being used for such CAs.

The CA enforces multi-factor authentication for all RA and Enterprise RA accounts capable of directly causing Subscriber Certificate issuance.

6.5.2 Computer Security Rating

No stipulation.

6.6 Life Cycle Security Controls

6.6.1 System Development Controls

No stipulation.

6.6.2 Security Management Controls

The configuration of the CA system as well as any modifications and upgrades are documented and controlled. Methods of detecting unauthorized modifications to the CA equipment and configuration are in place to ensure the integrity of the security software, firmware, and hardware for correct operation. A formal configuration management methodology is used for installation and ongoing maintenance of the CA system.

When first loaded, the CA software is verified as being that supplied from the vendor, with no modifications, and is the version intended for use.

6.6.3 Life Cycle Security Controls

No stipulation.

6.7 Network Security Controls

CA and RA systems are connected to a private network that is segmented and protected by multiple layers of firewalls from the internet and corporate networks. Flows between network segments are restricted to necessary ports and protocols to perform CA, RA or management functions under the Principle of Least Privilege. Systems are hardened with services, ports and accounts not used removed and/or disabled. Changes are documented and approved via a change management process and executed by Trusted Roles. Only Trusted Roles have access to CA and RA systems or the network components restricting access to CA systems.

6.8 Time-stamping

No stipulation.

7. Certificate, CRL and OCSP Profiles

7.1 Certificate Profile

CAs issue Certificates in accordance with the X.509 version 3. Certificate profiles for Root CA, Subordinate CA, and Subscriber Certificates are described in the sections below.

Certificates have a serial number greater than zero (0) that contains at least 64 unpredictable bits.

Subscriber Certificates are issued from dedicated Subordinate CAs based on the policy identifiers listed in §7.1.6.4.

7.1.1 Version Number

All Certificates issued by the CAs are X.509 version 3 certificates.

7.1.2 Certificate Extensions

Certificate extensions are as set as stipulated in IETF RFC 5280.

7.1.2.1 Root CA Certificate

Extension	Critical	Description
basicConstraints	Yes	CA field is set to be true pathLenConstraint field not present
keyUsage	Yes	Bit positions for keyCertSign and cRLSign are set
certificatePolicies		Not present
extendedKeyUsage		Not present

7.1.2.2 Subordinate CA Certificate

Extension	Critical	Description
basicConstraints	Yes	CA field is set to be true pathLenConstraint field not present
keyUsage	Yes	Bit positions for keyCertSign and cRLSign are set
certificatePolicies	No	Policy Identifier, Qualifier ID of CPS and URI for CPS are required
extendedKeyUsage	No	As applicable from the following: None present Server Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) Secure Email (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4)
cRLDistributionPoints	No	HTTP URL of the CA’s CRL service
authorityInformationAccess	No	HTTP URL of the Issuing CA’s OCSP responder

7.1.2.3 Subscriber Certificate

Extension	Critical	Description
basicConstraints		Not present
keyUsage	Yes	As applicable from the following: Digital Signature Key Encipherment
certificatePolicies	No	Policy Identifier, Qualifier ID of CPS and URI for CPS are required
extendedKeyUsage	No	As applicable from the following: None present Server Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) Secure Email (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4)
cRLDistributionPoints	No	HTTP URL of the CA’s CRL service
authorityInformationAccess	No	HTTP URL of the Issuing CA’s OCSP responder HTTP URL of the Issuing CA’s certificate

7.1.2.4 All Certificates

Except as indicated in this CPS, all other fields and extensions are set in accordance with RFC 5280.

7.1.2.5 Application of RFC 5280

No stipulation.

7.1.3 Algorithm Object Identifiers

Algorithm object identifiers are as specified in IETF RFC 3279 and RFC 4005.

The following signature algorithms may be used: SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512.

7.1.4 Name Forms

7.1.4.1 Issuer Information

The content of the certificate issuer DN field will match the subject DN of the issuing CA to support name chaining as specified in RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.4.

7.1.4.2 Subject Information – Subscriber Certificates

Name forms for Subscriber Certificates are as stipulated in §3.1.1. All other optional attributes must contain information that has been verified by the CA or RA. Optional attributes will not contain only metadata such as ‘.’, ‘-’, and ‘ ’ (i.e. space) characters, and/or any other indication that the value is absent, incomplete, or not applicable.

7.1.4.3 Subject Information – Root CA Certificates and Subordinate CA Certificates

No stipulation.

7.1.5 Name Constraints

No stipulation.

7.1.6 Certificate Policy Object Identifier

7.1.6.1 Reserved Certificate Policy Identifiers

No stipulation.

7.1.6.2 Root CA Certificates

Root CA Certificates do not contain the certificate policy object identifiers.

7.1.6.3 Subordinate CA Certificates

Subordinate CA Certificates must include either the “any policy” certificate policy object identifier or one or more explicit certificate policy object identifiers that indicates compliance with a specific certificate policy. Certificate policy object identifiers are listed in §7.1.6.4.

7.1.6.4 Subscriber Certificates

Certificates may include one of the following certificate policy identifiers:

Private SSL Certificates (Shared CA):	2.16.840.1.114028.10.1.9.1
Private SSL Certificates (Dedicated CA):	2.16.840.1.114028.10.1.9.5
Mobile Device Certificates:	2.16.840.1.114028.10.1.9.4
Client Authentication (OV) Certificates	2.16.840.1.114028.10.1.14.1.1
Client Authentication (EV) Certificates	2.16.840.1.114028.10.1.14.1.2

7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints Extension

No stipulation.

7.1.8 Policy Qualifiers Syntax and Semantics

No stipulation.

7.1.9 Processing Semantics for the Critical Certificate Policies Extension

Certificate policies extension is marked Not Critical.

7.2 CRL Profile

The following fields of the X.509 version 2 CRL format are used by the CAs:

- version: set to v2
- signature: identifier of the algorithm used to sign the CRL
- issuer: the full Distinguished Name of the CA issuing the CRL
- this update: time of CRL issuance
- next update: time of next expected CRL update
- revoked Certificates: list of revoked Certificate information

7.2.1 Version Number

CRLs issued by the CAs are X.509 version 2.

7.2.2 CRL and CRL Entry Extensions

reasonCode (OID 2.5.29.21)

The CRLReason code extension maybe used for revoked Certificates and will not be marked critical. The CRLReason indicated must not be unspecified (0) and if reasonCode unspecified (0) is used, the CA will omit the reasonCode entry in the CRL.

This extension must not be marked critical. The most appropriate reason must be selected by the Subscriber or the CA from one the following:

- (i) keyCompromise (1), if the key to the certificate has been or is suspected to be compromised or has signed Suspect Code;
- (ii) cACompromise (2), if the CA has been or is suspected to be compromised;
- (iii) affiliationChanged (3), if verified information in the Certificate has changed and as such the Relying Parties should no longer trust the Certificate
- (iv) superseded (4), if the Certificate has been reissued, rekeyed or renewed by another Certificate, the CA has evidence the validation of domain or IP address should not be relied upon or the Certificate was not issued in accordance with this CPS;
- (v) cessationOfOperation (5), if the website or device is no longer in service or the Subscriber no longer controls the domain or IP address; or
- (vi) privilegeWithdrawn (9), if the CA determines the privilege of the Certificate issued the Subscriber no longer exists.

The default revocation reason is unspecified (0) which results in no reasonCode being provided in the CRL. The CA will not use reasonCode certificateHold (6). The privilegeWithdrawn (9) reasonCode is not made available to the Subscriber.

7.3 OCSP Profile

The profile for the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) messages issued by a CA conform to the specifications contained in the IETF RFC 6960 Internet X.509 PKI Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile.

If an OCSP response is for a Root CA or Subordinate CA Certificate, including Cross Certificates, and that certificate has been revoked, then the revocationReason field within the RevokedInfo of the CertStatus will be present.

The CRLReason indicated contains a value permitted for CRLs, as specified in §7.2.2.

7.3.1 Version Number

No stipulation.

7.3.2 OCSP Extensions

The singleExtensions of an OCSP response do not contain the reasonCode (OID 2.5.29.21) CRL entry extension.

8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessment

8.1 Frequency or Circumstances of Assessment

Compliance audits will be performed on Shared CAs. Compliance audits may be performed on Dedicated CAs.

The period during which the CA issues Certificates will be divided into an unbroken sequence of audit periods. An audit period will not exceed one year in duration.

8.2 Identity/Qualifications of Assessor

The compliance audit of the CAs is performed by an auditor which possesses the following qualifications and skills:

- i. Independence from the subject of the audit;
- ii. Ability to conduct an audit that addresses the criteria of the audit schemes specified in §8.4;
- iii. Employs individuals who have proficiency in examining PKI technology, information security tools and techniques, information technology and security auditing, and the third-party attestation function; and
- iv. Bound by law, government regulation, or professional code of ethics.

8.3 Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Entity

The certified public accounting firm selected to perform the compliance audit for the CAs and RAs will be independent from the entity being audited.

8.4 Topics Covered by Assessment

The compliance audit will test compliance of the CAs and RAs against the policies and procedures set forth, as applicable in:

- i. This CPS; and
- ii. WebTrust for Certification Authorities;

8.5 Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency

Upon receipt of a compliance audit that identifies any deficiencies, the audited CA or RA will use commercially reasonable efforts to correct any such deficiencies in an expeditious manner.

8.6 Communication of Results

The results of all compliance audits will be communicated to the Policy Authority and to any third party entities which are entitled by law or regulation to receive a copy of the audit results.

8.7 Self-audits

All Subscriber Certificates are self-audited using Linting software to monitor adherence to the applicable items of this CPS, limited to the linter coverage.

9. Other Business and Legal Matters

9.1 Fees

Unless otherwise set out in a contract with Entrust, the fees for services provided by Entrust with respect to Certificates are set forth on the websites (including e-commerce sites) operated by Entrust. Unless otherwise set out in a contract with Entrust, these fees are subject to change, and any such changes shall become effective immediately after posting on such websites (including e-commerce sites). The fees for services provided by independent third-party RAs, Resellers and Co-marketers in respect to Certificates are set forth on the websites operated by such RAs, Resellers and Co-marketers. These fees are subject to change, and any such changes shall become effective immediately after posting on such websites.

9.1.1 Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees

No stipulation.

9.1.2 Certificate Access Fees

No stipulation.

9.1.3 Revocation or Status Information Access Fees

No stipulation.

9.1.4 Fees for Other Services

No stipulation.

9.1.5 Refund Policy

Except for a formal written Entrust refund policy, if any, neither Entrust nor any RAs operating under the CAs provide any refunds for Certificates or services provided in respect to Certificates.

9.2 Financial Responsibility

Subscribers and Relying Parties shall be responsible for the financial consequences to such Subscribers, Relying Parties, and to any other persons, entities, or organizations for any transactions in which such Subscribers or Relying Parties participate and which use Certificates or any services provided in respect to Certificates.

9.2.1 Insurance Coverage

Entrust maintains (a) Commercial General Liability insurance with policy limits of at least two million US dollars (US\$2,000,000.00) in coverage; and (b) Professional Liability/Errors and Omissions insurance, with policy limits of at least five million US dollars (US\$5,000,000.00) in coverage. Such insurance policies will be carried with companies rated no less than A- as to Policy Holder's Rating in the current edition of Best's Insurance Guide.

9.2.2 Other Assets

No stipulation.

9.2.3 Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-entities

No stipulation.

9.3 Confidentiality of Business Information

9.3.1 Scope of Confidential Information

The following information is considered confidential information of Entrust and is protected against disclosure using a reasonable degree of care:

- Private Keys;

- Activation data used to access Private Keys or to gain access to the CA system;
- Business continuity, incident response, contingency, and disaster recovery plans;
- Other security practices used to protect the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information;
- Information held by Entrust as private information in accordance with 9.4;
- Audit logs and archive records; and
- Transaction records, financial audit records, and external or internal audit trail records and any audit reports (with the exception of an auditor's letter confirming the effectiveness of the controls set forth in this CPS).

9.3.2 Information not with the Scope of Confidential Information

Information that is included in a Certificate or a Certificate Revocation List are considered public.

9.3.3 Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information

Entrust's employees, agents, and contractors are responsible for protecting confidential information and are contractually obligated to do so. Entrust systems are configured to protect confidential information.

9.4 Privacy or Personal Information

9.4.1 Privacy Plan

Entrust follows the policies, statements and practices available at <https://www.entrust.com/legal-compliance/privacy> ("Privacy Plan") when handling personal information.

9.4.2 Information Treated as Private

Entrust treats all personal information about an individual that is not publicly available in the contents of a Certificate, CRL or OCSP as personal information in accordance with the Privacy Plan.

9.4.3 Information not Deemed Private

Subject to applicable law, Certificates, CRLs, and OCSP and the personal or corporate information appearing in them are not considered personal or private information.

9.4.4 Responsibility to Protect Private Information

Entrust personnel are required to protect personal information in accordance with the Privacy Plan.

9.4.5 Notice and Consent to Use Private Information

Unless otherwise stated in the CPS, Privacy Plan or other agreement (such as a Subscriber Agreement or Relying Party Agreement), personal information will not be used without the consent of the subject of such personal information. Notwithstanding the foregoing, personal information contained in a Certificate may be published in online public repositories and all Subscribers consent to the global transfer of any personal data contained in the Certificate.

9.4.6 Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process

Entrust, independent third-party RAs under a CA, Resellers, and Co-marketers shall have the right to release information that is considered to be personal or confidential to law enforcement officials in compliance with applicable law.

Entrust, independent third-party RAs under a CA, Resellers, and Co-marketers may disclose information that is considered confidential during the course of any arbitration, litigation, or any other legal, judicial, or administrative proceeding relating to such information. Any such disclosures shall be permissible provided that Entrust, the independent third-party RA, Reseller, or Co-marketer uses commercially reasonable efforts to obtain a court-entered protective order restricting the use and disclosure of any such information to the extent reasonably required for the purposes of such arbitration, litigation, or any other legal, judicial, or administrative proceeding.

9.4.7 Other Information Disclosure Circumstances

Entrust, independent third-party RAs under a CA, Resellers, and Co-marketers may disclose information provided to Entrust, such RA, Reseller or Co-marketer, by an Applicant, a Subscriber, or a Relying Party upon request of such Applicant, Subscriber, or Relying Party.

If a Certificate is revoked by a CA, the Certificate status will be provided by the CRL and OCSP response.

9.5 Intellectual Property Rights

Entrust retains all right, title, and interest (including all intellectual property rights), in, to and under the CPS and all Certificates, except for any information that is supplied by an Applicant or a Subscriber and that is included in a Certificate, which information shall remain the property of the Applicant or Subscriber. Subject to availability, Entrust may in its discretion make copies of one or more Subordinate CA Certificate(s) available to Subscribers for use solely with the Certificate issued to such Subscribers. Entrust retains all right, title, and interest (including all intellectual property rights), in, to and under the Subordinate CA Certificate(s). No right is or shall be deemed to be granted under this CPS, whether by implication, estoppel, inference or otherwise.

9.6 Representation and Warranties

9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties

Entrust makes the following limited warranties with respect to the operation of the CAs. A CA shall:

- (i) provide CA services in accordance with the CPS;
- (ii) upon receipt of a request from an RA operating under such CA, issue a Certificate in accordance with the practices and procedures set forth in the CPS;
- (iii) make available Certificate revocation information by issuing Certificates and by issuing and making available Certificate CRLs in a Repository in accordance with the CPS;
- (iv) issue and publish Certificate CRLs on a regular schedule in accordance with the CPS;
- (v) provide revocation services consistent with the procedures set forth in the CPS; and
- (vi) provide Repository services consistent with the practices and procedures set forth in the CPS.

In operating the CAs, Entrust may use one or more representatives or agents to perform its obligations under the CPS, any Subscriber Agreements, or any Relying Party Agreements, provided that Entrust shall remain responsible for its performance.

In no event does the Entrust Group make any representations, or provide any warranties, or conditions to any Applicants, Subscribers, Relying Parties, or any other persons, entities, or organizations with respect to (i) the techniques used by any party other than Entrust in the generation and storage of the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in a Certificate, including, whether such Private Key has been Compromised or was generated using sound cryptographic techniques, (ii) the reliability of any cryptographic techniques or methods used in conducting any act, transaction, or process involving or utilizing a Certificate, or (iii) non-repudiation of any Certificate or any transaction facilitated through the use of a Certificate, since such determination is a matter of applicable law.

9.6.2 RA Representations and Warranties

RAs operating under a CA shall:

- (i) receive Certificate Applications in accordance with the CPS;
- (ii) perform, log and secure verification of information submitted by Applicants when applying for Certificates, and if such verification is successful, submit a request to a CA for the issuance of a Certificate, all in accordance with the CPS;
- (iii) receive and verify requests from Subscribers for the revocation of Certificates, and if the verification of a revocation request is successful, submit a request to a CA for the revocation of such Certificate, all in accordance with the CPS;

- (iv) notify Subscribers, in accordance with the CPS, that a Certificate has been issued to them; and
- (v) notify Subscribers, in accordance with the CPS that and Certificate issued to them has been revoked or will soon expire.

Entrust may use one or more representatives or agents to perform its obligations in respect of an Entrust RA under the CPS, any Subscriber Agreements, or any Relying Party Agreements, provided that Entrust shall remain responsible for the performance of such representatives or agents under the CPS, any Subscriber Agreements, or any Relying Party Agreements. Entrust may appoint independent third parties to act as RAs under a CA. Such independent third-party RAs shall be responsible for their performance under the CPS, any Subscriber Agreements, or any Relying Party Agreements. Entrust shall not be responsible for the performance of such independent third-party RAs. Independent third-party RAs may use one or more representatives or agents to perform their obligations when acting as an RA under a CA. Independent third-party RAs shall remain responsible for the performance of such representatives or agents under the CPS, any Subscriber Agreements, or any Relying Party Agreements. Entrust may appoint Resellers and Co-marketers for (i) Certificates, and (ii) services provided in respect to Certificates. Such Resellers and Co-marketers shall be responsible for their performance under the CPS, any Subscriber Agreements, or any Relying Party Agreements. Entrust shall not be responsible for the performance of any such Resellers and Co-marketers. Resellers and Co-marketers may use one or more representatives or agents to perform their obligations under the CPS, any Subscriber Agreements, or any Relying Party Agreements. Resellers and Co-marketers shall remain responsible for the performance of such representatives or agents under the CPS, any Subscriber Agreements, or any Relying Party Agreements. Independent third-party RAs, Resellers, and Co-marketers shall be entitled to receive all of the benefit of all (i) disclaimers of representations, warranties, and conditions, (ii) limitations of liability, (iii) representations and warranties from Applicants, Subscribers, and Relying Parties, and (iv) indemnities from Applicants, Subscribers, and Relying Parties, set forth in this CPS, any Subscriber Agreements, and any Relying Party Agreements.

9.6.3 Subscriber representations and Warranties

As a condition of having any Certificate issued to or for Subscriber, each Subscriber (in this section, “Subscriber” includes “Applicant” when referring to any time prior to issuance of the Certificate) makes, on its own behalf and if applicable on behalf of its principal or agent under a subcontractor or hosting service relationship, the representations, commitments, affirmations and warranties set out in each applicable Subscriber Agreement for the benefit of Certificate Beneficiaries, Entrust and any of Entrust’s Affiliates that will issue Certificates to or for Subscriber. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

9.6.3.1 For all Certificates:

- (i) If Subscriber is applying for a Certificate to be issued to or for another Person, such Person has authorized Subscriber to act on its behalf, including to request Certificates on behalf of such Person, and to make the representations, commitments, affirmations and warranties in this s.9.6.3 on behalf of such Person as well as on Subscriber’s own behalf.
- (ii) All information provided, and all representations made, at all times, by Subscriber in relation to any Certificate Services, including in the Certificate request and otherwise in connection with Certificate issuance, are and will be complete, correct and accurate, including that any legal entity Subject legally exists as a valid entity in the jurisdiction of incorporation or registration specified in the Certificate (and such information and representations will be promptly updated from time to time as necessary to maintain such completeness, correctness and accuracy), and does not infringe, misappropriate, dilute, unfairly compete with, or otherwise violate the intellectual property, or other rights of any person, entity, or organization in any jurisdiction. For clarity, in submitting any request for a Certificate using pre-qualified information, a Subscriber is deemed to be making anew the representations, commitments, affirmations and warranties set out in this Exhibit B, and Entrust will have no obligation to issue any Certificate containing pre-qualified information if such information is subsequently found to have changed or to be in any way inaccurate, incorrect, or misleading.
- (iii) The Private Key corresponding to the Public Key submitted to Entrust with the Certificate request was created using sound cryptographic techniques and all reasonable measures have been taken to, at all times, assure control of, keep confidential, properly protect, and prohibit unauthorized use of, the private key (and any associated access or activation data or device, e.g., password or token).

- (iv) Any device storing Private Keys will be operated and maintained in a secure manner.
- (v) A Certificate will not be installed or used until Subscriber has reviewed and verified that the content of the Certificate is accurate and correct.
- (vi) In the case of all Private SSL Certificates, the Certificate will be installed only on servers that are accessible at the domain name (subjectAltName(s)) listed in the Certificate.
- (vii) Certificates and the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key listed in such Certificate will only be used in compliance with all applicable laws and solely in accordance with the Subscriber Agreement, and will only be used on behalf of the organization listed as the Subject in such Certificates.
- (viii) The contents of Certificates will not be improperly modified.
- (ix) Subscriber will notify Entrust, cease all use of the Certificate and the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate, and request the revocation of the Certificate,
 - a. promptly, if any information included in the Certificate or the application for a Certificate changes, is or becomes incorrect or inaccurate, or if any change in any circumstances would make the information in the Certificate misleading.
 - b. immediately, if there is any actual or suspected Key Compromise, or if control over the Private Key has been lost for other reasons.
- (x) Subscriber will promptly cease all use of the Certificate and the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in such Certificate upon expiration or revocation of such Certificate.
- (xi) Subscriber will immediately respond to Entrust's instructions concerning any Key Compromise or misuse or suspected misuse of a Certificate.
- (xii) Subscriber acknowledges and agrees that Entrust is entitled to revoke a Certificate immediately if:
 - a. Subscriber breaches the Subscriber Agreement.
 - b. Entrust discovers that there has been a Compromise of the Certificate's Private Key.
 - c. the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate has been used to digitally sign Suspect Code.
- (xiii) Where the Subject named in the Certificate(s) is a separate entity from the Subscriber, the Subject has authorized the inclusion of the Subject's information in the Certificate.
- (xiv) Subscriber owns, controls, or has the exclusive right to use the domain name or email address listed in Certificate.
- (xv) Subscriber acknowledges and agrees that Entrust is entitled to modify the Subscriber Agreement when necessary to comply with any changes in Industry Standards (as defined in the Subscriber Agreement).
- (xvi) Subscriber will use appropriate judgment about whether it is appropriate, given the level of security and trust provided by Certificate, to use the Certificate in any given circumstance.

9.6.4 Relying Parties Representations and Warranties

Each Relying Party makes the following representations, commitments, affirmations and warranties:

- (i) The Relying Party shall understand and, if necessary, receive proper education in the use of Public-Key cryptography and Certificates including Certificates.
- (ii) The Relying Party shall read and agree to all terms and conditions of the CPS and the Relying Party Agreement.
- (iii) The Relying Party shall verify Certificates, including use of CRLs, in accordance with the certification path validation procedure specified in ITU-T Rec. X.509:2005 | ISO/IEC 9594-8 (2005), taking into account any critical extensions and approved technical corrigenda as appropriate.
- (iv) The Relying Party shall trust and make use of a Certificate only if the Certificate has not expired or been revoked and if a proper chain of trust can be established to a trustworthy Root CA.
- (v) The Relying Party shall properly validate a Certificate before making a determination about whether to rely on such Certificate, including confirmation that the Certificate has not expired or been revoked and that a proper chain of trust can be established to a trustworthy Root CA.
- (vi) The Relying Party shall not rely on a Certificate that cannot be validated back to a trustworthy Root CA.
- (vii) The Relying Party shall make its own judgment and rely on a Certificate only if such reliance is reasonable in the circumstances, including determining whether such reliance is reasonable given the nature of the security and trust provided by a Certificate and the value of any transaction that may involve the use of a Certificate.
- (viii) The Relying Party shall exercise its own judgment in determining whether it is reasonable under the circumstances to rely on a Certificate, including determining whether such reliance is reasonable given

the nature of the security and trust provided by an Certificate and the value of any transaction that may involve the use of a Certificate.

- (ix) The Relying Party shall not use a Certificate for any hazardous or unlawful (including tortious) activities.
- (x) The Relying Party shall not rely on a revoked or expired Certificate.

9.6.5 Representations and Warranties of Other Participants

No stipulation.

9.7 Disclaimers of Warranties

EXCEPT FOR THE LIMITED WARRANTY DESCRIBED IN §9.6.1 ABOVE, AND EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THE SUBSCRIBER AGREEMENT, ENTRUST GROUP EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS AND MAKES NO REPRESENTATION, WARRANTY OR COVENANT OF ANY KIND, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, EITHER IN FACT OR BY OPERATION OF LAW, WITH RESPECT TO THIS CPS OR ANY CERTIFICATE ISSUED HEREUNDER, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ALL WARRANTIES OF QUALITY, MERCHANTABILITY, NON-INFRINGEMENT, TITLE AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, AND ALL WARRANTIES, REPRESENTATIONS, CONDITIONS, UNDERTAKINGS, TERMS AND OBLIGATIONS IMPLIED BY STATUTE OR COMMON LAW, TRADE USAGE, COURSE OF DEALING OR OTHERWISE ARE HEREBY EXCLUDED TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW. EXCEPT FOR THE LIMITED WARRANTY DESCRIBED ABOVE, ENTRUST GROUP FURTHER DISCLAIM AND MAKES NO REPRESENTATION, WARRANTY OR COVENANT OF ANY KIND, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, EITHER IN FACT OR BY OPERATION OF LAW, TO ANY APPLICANT, SUBSCRIBER OR ANY RELYING PARTY THAT (A) THE SUBSCRIBER TO WHICH IT HAS ISSUED A CERTIFICATE IS IN THE FACT THE PERSON, ENTITY OR ORGANIZATION IT CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN (B) A SUBSCRIBER IS IN FACT THE PERSON, ENTITY OR ORGANIZATION LISTED IN THE CERTIFICATE, OR (C) THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE CERTIFICATES OR IN ANY CERTIFICATE STATUS MECHANISM COMPILED, PUBLISHED OR OTHERWISE DISSEMINATED BY ENTRUST, OR THE RESULTS OF ANY CRYPTOGRAPHIC METHOD IMPLEMENTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE CERTIFICATES IS ACCURATE, AUTHENTIC, COMPLETE OR RELIABLE.

IT IS AGREED AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT APPLICANTS AND SUBSCRIBERS ARE LIABLE FOR ANY MISREPRESENTATIONS MADE TO ENTRUST AND RELIED UPON BY A RELYING PARTY. ENTRUST GROUP DOES NOT WARRANT OR GUARANTEE UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES THE "NON-REPUDIATION" BY A SUBSCRIBER AND/OR RELYING PARTY OF ANY TRANSACTION ENTERED INTO BY THE SUBSCRIBER AND/OR RELYING PARTY INVOLVING THE USE OF OR RELIANCE UPON A CERTIFICATE.

IT IS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED UPON BY SUBSCRIBERS AND RELYING PARTIES THAT IN USING AND/OR RELYING UPON A CERTIFICATE THEY ARE SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR RELIANCE UPON THAT CERTIFICATE AND THAT SUCH PARTIES MUST CONSIDER THE FACTS, CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONTEXT SURROUNDING THE TRANSACTION IN WHICH THE CERTIFICATE IS USED IN DETERMINING SUCH RELIANCE.

THE SUBSCRIBERS AND RELYING PARTIES AGREE AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT CERTIFICATES HAVE A LIMITED OPERATIONAL PERIOD AND MAY BE REVOKED AT ANY TIME. SUBSCRIBERS AND RELYING PARTIES ARE UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO VERIFY WHETHER A CERTIFICATE IS EXPIRED OR HAS BEEN REVOKED. ENTRUST GROUP HEREBY DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL LIABILITY TO SUBSCRIBERS AND RELYING PARTIES WHO DO NOT FOLLOW SUCH PROCEDURES. MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE SITUATIONS IN WHICH A CERTIFICATE MAY BE REVOKED CAN BE FOUND IN §4.9.3 OF THIS CPS.

9.8 Limitations of Liability

9.8.1 ENTRUST GROUP'S ENTIRE LIABILITY UNDER THIS CPS TO: (I) AN APPLICANT OR SUBSCRIBER IS SET OUT IN THE SUBSCRIBER AGREEMENT BETWEEN ENTRUST (OR AN

ENTRUST GROUP AFFILIATE) AND SUCH SUBSCRIBER; AND (II) A RELYING PARTY IS SET OUT IN THE RELYING PARTY AGREEMENT POSTED IN THE REPOSITORY ON THE DATE THE RELYING PARTY RELIES ON SUCH CERTIFICATE. THE ENTRUST GROUP'S ENTIRE LIABILITY TO ANY OTHER PARTY IS SET OUT IN THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN ENTRUST AND SUCH OTHER PARTY.

9.8.2 SUBJECT TO THE FOREGOING AND IF §9.8.1 ABOVE DOES NOT APPLY:

9.8.2.1 TO THE EXTENT ENTRUST HAS ISSUED THE CERTIFICATE(S) IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE CPS, THE ENTRUST GROUP SHALL HAVE NO LIABILITY TO ANY PERSON FOR ANY CLAIMS, DAMAGES OR LOSSES SUFFERED AS THE RESULT OF THE USE OF OR RELIANCE ON SUCH CERTIFICATE. IN NO EVENT WILL ENTRUST GROUP BE LIABLE FOR, AND CUSTOMER WAIVES ANY RIGHT IT MAY HAVE TO, ANY CONSEQUENTIAL, INDIRECT, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE OR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OR FOR ANY LOSS OF BUSINESS, OPPORTUNITIES, CONTRACTS, REVENUES, PROFITS, SAVINGS, GOODWILL, REPUTATION, USE, OR DATA, OR COSTS OF REPROCUREMENT OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION, OR ANY LOSS OR DAMAGE THAT IS NOT DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE USE OR RELIANCE ON A CERTIFICATE OR THE CERTIFICATE SERVICES PROVIDED UNDER THIS AGREEMENT AND THE CPS INCLUDING ANY LOSS OR DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THE COMBINATION OR INTEGRATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OR CERTIFICATE SERVICES WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE NOT PROVIDED BY ENTRUST IF THE LOSS OR DAMAGE WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF USE OF THE CERTIFICATE OR CERTIFICATE SERVICES ALONE.

9.8.2.2 IN NO EVENT WILL ENTRUST GROUP'S TOTAL AGGREGATE LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO THIS AGREEMENT, THE CPS AND THE USE AND PERFORMANCE OF ANY PRODUCTS AND SERVICES PROVIDED HEREUNDER EXCEED THE GREATER OF (1) ONE THOUSAND UNITED STATES DOLLARS (\$1,000.00 U.S.), OR (2) THE FEES PAID BY SUCH PARTY TO ENTRUST UNDER THIS CPS DURING THE TWELVE MONTHS PRIOR TO THE INITIATION OF THE CLAIM TO A MAXIMUM OF ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS (\$100,000.00).

9.8.2.3 THE EXCLUSIONS AND LIMITS IN THIS SECTION (LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY) APPLY: (A) REGARDLESS OF THE FORM OF ACTION, WHETHER IN CONTRACT (INCLUDING FUNDAMENTAL BREACH), TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE), WARRANTY, BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY, MISREPRESENTATION, STRICT LIABILITY, STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY, OR OTHERWISE; (B) ON AN AGGREGATE BASIS, REGARDLESS OF THE NUMBER OF CLAIMS, TRANSACTIONS, DIGITAL SIGNATURES OR CERTIFICATES; (C) EVEN IF THE POSSIBILITY OF THE DAMAGES IN QUESTION WAS KNOWN OR COMMUNICATED IN ADVANCE AND EVEN IF SUCH DAMAGES WERE FORESEEABLE; AND (D) EVEN IF THE REMEDIES FAIL OF THEIR ESSENTIAL PURPOSE. ENTRUST HAS SET ITS PRICES AND PROVIDES CERTIFICATES IN RELIANCE ON THE EXCLUSIONS AND LIMITS IN THIS SECTION (LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY), WHICH FORM AN ESSENTIAL BASIS OF THE PROVISION OF THE SERVICES DESCRIBED IN THIS CPS.

9.8.2.4 In no event will Entrust or its Affiliates be liable to Subscribers, Relying Parties or any other person, entity or organization for any losses, costs, expenses, liabilities, damages, claims, or settlement amounts arising out of or related to the use or misuse of, or reliance on any Certificate issued under this CPS that: (i) has expired or been revoked; (ii) has been used for any purpose other than as set forth in this CPS or an applicable Subscriber Agreement; (iii) has been tampered with; (iv) with respect to which the Key Pair underlying such Certificate or the cryptography algorithm used to generate such Certificate's Key Pair has been compromised by the action of any party other than Entrust or its Affiliates (including without limitation the Subscriber or Relying Party); or (v) is the subject of misrepresentations or other misleading acts or omissions of any other party, including but not limited to Subscribers and Relying Parties. Except to the extent expressly provided in this CPS or an applicable Subscriber Agreement or Relying Party Agreement, in no event shall Entrust or its Affiliates be liable to the Subscriber, Relying Party or other party for damages arising out of any claim that the content of a Certificate infringes any patent, trademark, copyright, trade secret or other intellectual property right of any party.

9.8.2.5 Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Section (Limitation of Liability) or elsewhere in the Subscriber Agreement, to the extent required by applicable law Entrust neither excludes nor limits its liability for: (i) death or bodily injury caused by its own negligence; (ii) its own fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation; or (iii) other matters for which liability cannot be excluded or limited under applicable law.

9.9 Indemnities

9.9.1 Indemnification by CAs

No stipulation.

9.9.2 Indemnification for Relying Parties

RELYING PARTIES SHALL INDEMNIFY AND HOLD ENTRUST GROUP AND ALL INDEPENDENT THIRD-PARTY REGISTRATION AUTHORITIES OPERATING UNDER A CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY (COLLECTIVELY, THE “INDEMNIFIED PARTIES”) HARMLESS FROM AND AGAINST ANY AND ALL LIABILITIES, LOSSES, COSTS, EXPENSES, DAMAGES, CLAIMS, AND SETTLEMENT AMOUNTS (INCLUDING REASONABLE ATTORNEY’S FEES, COURT COSTS, AND EXPERT’S FEES) ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO ANY USE OR RELIANCE BY A RELYING PARTY ON ANY CERTIFICATE OR ANY SERVICE PROVIDED IN RESPECT TO CERTIFICATES, INCLUDING (I) LACK OF PROPER VALIDATION OF A CERTIFICATE BY A RELYING PARTY, (II) RELIANCE BY THE RELYING PARTY ON AN EXPIRED OR REVOKED CERTIFICATE, (III) USE OF A CERTIFICATE OTHER THAN AS PERMITTED BY THE CPS, THE SUBSCRIBER AGREEMENT, ANY RELYING PARTY AGREEMENT, AND APPLICABLE LAW, (IV) FAILURE BY A RELYING PARTY TO EXERCISE REASONABLE JUDGMENT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN RELYING ON A CERTIFICATE, OR (V) ANY CLAIM OR ALLEGATION THAT THE RELIANCE BY A RELYING PARTY ON A CERTIFICATE OR THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN A CERTIFICATE INFRINGES, MISAPPROPRIATES, DILUTES, UNFAIRLY COMPETES WITH, OR OTHERWISE VIOLATES THE RIGHTS INCLUDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR ANY OTHER RIGHTS OF ANYONE IN ANY JURISDICTION. NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING, RELYING PARTIES SHALL NOT BE OBLIGATED TO PROVIDE ANY INDEMNIFICATION TO AN INDEMNIFIED PARTY IN RESPECT TO ANY LIABILITIES, LOSSES, COSTS, EXPENSES, DAMAGES, CLAIMS, AND SETTLEMENT AMOUNTS (INCLUDING REASONABLE ATTORNEY’S FEES, COURT COSTS AND EXPERT’S FEES) TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH LIABILITIES, LOSSES, COSTS, EXPENSES, DAMAGES, CLAIMS, AND SETTLEMENT AMOUNTS (INCLUDING REASONABLE ATTORNEY’S FEES, COURT COSTS, AND EXPERT’S FEES) ARISE OUT OF OR RELATE TO ANY WILLFUL MISCONDUCT BY SUCH INDEMNIFIED PARTY.

9.9.3 Indemnification by Subscribers

UNLESS OTHERWISE SET OUT IN AN AGREEMENT WITH ENTRUST, SUBSCRIBERS SHALL INDEMNIFY AND HOLD ENTRUST AND ALL INDEPENDENT THIRD-PARTY REGISTRATION AUTHORITIES OPERATING UNDER A CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY (COLLECTIVELY, THE “INDEMNIFIED PARTIES”) HARMLESS FROM AND AGAINST ANY AND ALL LIABILITIES, LOSSES, COSTS, EXPENSES, DAMAGES, CLAIMS, AND SETTLEMENT AMOUNTS (INCLUDING REASONABLE ATTORNEY’S FEES, COURT COSTS, AND EXPERT’S FEES) ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO ANY RELIANCE BY A RELYING PARTY ON ANY CERTIFICATE OR ANY SERVICE PROVIDED IN RESPECT TO CERTIFICATES, INCLUDING ANY (I) ERROR, MISREPRESENTATION OR OMISSION MADE BY A SUBSCRIBER IN USING OR APPLYING FOR A CERTIFICATE, (II) MODIFICATION MADE BY A SUBSCRIBER TO THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN A CERTIFICATE, (III) USE OF A CERTIFICATE OTHER THAN AS PERMITTED BY THE CPS, THE SUBSCRIBER AGREEMENT, ANY RELYING PARTY AGREEMENT, AND APPLICABLE LAW, (IV) FAILURE BY A SUBSCRIBER TO TAKE THE NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS TO PREVENT LOSS, DISCLOSURE, COMPROMISE OR UNAUTHORIZED USE OF THE PRIVATE KEY CORRESPONDING TO THE PUBLIC KEY IN SUCH SUBSCRIBER’S CERTIFICATE, OR (V) ALLEGATION THAT THE USE OF A SUBSCRIBER’S CERTIFICATE OR

THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN A SUBSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE INFRINGES, MISAPPROPRIATES, DILUTES, UNFAIRLY COMPETES WITH, OR OTHERWISE VIOLATES THE RIGHTS INCLUDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR ANY OTHER RIGHTS OF ANYONE IN ANY JURISDICTION. NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING, A SUBSCRIBER SHALL NOT BE OBLIGATED TO PROVIDE ANY INDEMNIFICATION TO AN INDEMNIFIED PARTY IN RESPECT TO ANY LIABILITIES, LOSSES, COSTS, EXPENSES, DAMAGES, CLAIMS, AND SETTLEMENT AMOUNTS (INCLUDING REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES, COURT COSTS AND EXPERTS FEES) TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH LIABILITIES, LOSSES, COSTS, EXPENSES, DAMAGES, CLAIMS, AND SETTLEMENT AMOUNTS (INCLUDING REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES, COURT COSTS, AND EXPERT'S FEES) ARISE OUT OF OR RELATE TO ANY WILLFUL MISCONDUCT BY SUCH INDEMNIFIED PARTY.

9.10 Term and Termination

9.10.1 Term

This CPS will be effective on the date this CPS is published in the Repository and will continue until a newer version of the CPS is published.

9.10.2 Termination

This CPS will remain in effect until replaced by a newer version.

9.10.3 Effect of Termination and Survival

The provisions of sections 1.6, 3.1.6, 5.5, 9.1, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 9.7, 9.8, 9.9.2, 9.9.3, 9.10.3, 9.13, 9.14 and 9.16 shall survive termination or expiration of the CPS, any Subscriber Agreements, and any Relying Party Agreements. All references to sections that survive termination of the CPS, any Subscriber Agreements, and any Relying Party Agreements, shall include all sub-sections of such sections.

9.11 Individual Notices and Communications with Participants

Unless otherwise set out in a Subscriber Agreement or Relying Party Agreement, any notice to be given to Entrust under this CPS, a Subscriber Agreement, or a Relying Party Agreement shall be given in writing to the address specified in §1.5.2 by prepaid receipted mail, or overnight courier, and shall be effective as follows (i) in the case of courier, on the next Business Day, and (ii) in the case of receipted mail, five (5) Business Days following the date of deposit in the mail. Any notice to be given by Entrust under the CPS, or any Subscriber Agreement shall be given by email or by prepaid receipted mail or courier to the last address, email address for the Subscriber on file with Entrust. In the event of notice by email, the notice shall become effective on the next Business Day. In the event of notice by prepaid receipted mail, or overnight courier, notice shall become effective as specified in (i) or (ii), depending on the means of notice utilized.

9.12 Amendments

9.12.1 Procedure for Amendment

Entrust may, in its discretion, modify the CPS and the terms and conditions contained herein from time to time.

9.12.2 Notification Mechanism and Period

Modifications to the CPS shall be published in the Repository and shall become effective fifteen (15) days after publication in the Repository unless Entrust withdraws such modified CPS prior to such effective date. In the event that Entrust makes a significant modification to CPS, the version number of the CPS shall be updated accordingly. Unless a Subscriber ceases to use, removes, and requests revocation of such Subscriber's Certificate(s) prior to the date on which an updated version of the CPS becomes effective, such Subscriber shall be deemed to have consented to the terms and conditions of such updated version of the CPS and shall be bound by the terms and conditions of such updated version of the CPS.

9.12.3 Circumstances Under which OID must be Changed

No stipulation.

9.13 Dispute Resolution Provisions

Unless otherwise set out in in a Subscriber Agreement or Relying Party Agreement, any disputes between a Subscriber or an Applicant and Entrust or any third-party RAs operating under the CAs, or a Relying Party and Entrust or any third-party RAs operating under the CAs, shall be submitted to mediation in accordance with the Commercial Mediation Rules of the American Arbitration Association which shall take place in English in Ottawa, Ontario. In the event that a resolution to such dispute cannot be achieved through mediation within thirty (30) days, the dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration. The arbitrator shall have the right to decide all questions of arbitrability. The dispute shall be finally settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association, as modified by this provision. Such arbitration shall take place in English in Ottawa, Ontario, before a sole arbitrator appointed by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) who shall be appointed by the AAA from its Technology Panel and shall be reasonably knowledgeable in electronic commerce disputes. The arbitrator shall apply the laws of the Province of Ontario, without regard to its conflict of laws provisions, and shall render a written decision within thirty (30) days from the date of close of the arbitration hearing, but no more than one (1) year from the date that the matter was submitted for arbitration. The decision of the arbitrator shall be binding and conclusive and may be entered in any court of competent jurisdiction. In each arbitration, the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of all or a portion of its costs in such arbitration, including reasonable attorney's fees actually incurred. Nothing in the CPS, or in any Subscriber Agreement, or any Relying Party Agreement shall preclude Entrust or any third-party RAs operating under the CAs from applying to any court of competent jurisdiction for temporary or permanent injunctive relief, without breach of this §9.13 and without any abridgment of the powers of the arbitrator, with respect to any (i) alleged Compromise that affects the integrity of a Certificate, or (ii) alleged breach of the terms and conditions of the CPS, any Subscriber Agreement, or any Relying Party Agreement. The institution of any arbitration or any action shall not relieve an Applicant, Subscriber or Relying Party of its obligations under the CPS, any Subscriber Agreement, or any Relying Party Agreement.

Any and all arbitrations or legal actions in respect to a dispute that is related to a Certificate or any services provided in respect to a Certificate shall be commenced prior to the end of one (1) year after (i) the expiration or revocation of the Certificate in dispute, or (ii) the date of provision of the disputed service or services in respect to the Certificate in dispute, whichever is sooner. If any arbitration or action in respect to a dispute that is related to a Certificate or any service or services provided in respect to a Certificate is not commenced prior to such time, any party seeking to institute such an arbitration or action shall be barred from commencing or proceeding with such arbitration or action.

9.14 Governing Law

Unless otherwise set out in in a Subscriber Agreement or Relying Party Agreement, the laws of the Province of Ontario, Canada, excluding its conflict of laws rules, shall govern the construction, validity, interpretation, enforceability and performance of the CPS, all Subscriber Agreements and all Relying Party Agreements. The application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods to the CPS, any Subscriber Agreements, and any Relying Party Agreements is expressly excluded. Any dispute arising out of or in respect to the CPS, any Subscriber Agreement, any Relying Party Agreement, or in respect to any Certificates or any services provided in respect to any Certificates that is not resolved by alternative dispute resolution, shall be brought in the provincial or federal courts sitting in Ottawa, Ontario, and each person, entity, or organization hereby agrees that such courts shall have personal and exclusive jurisdiction over such disputes. In the event that any matter is brought in a provincial or federal court, Applicants, Subscribers, and Relying Parties waive any right that such Applicants, Subscribers, and Relying Parties may have to a jury trial.

9.15 Compliance with Applicable Law

Certificates and related information may be subject to export, import, and/or use restrictions. Subscribers and Relying Parties will comply in all respects with any and all applicable laws, rules and regulations and obtain all permits, licenses and authorizations or certificates that may be required in connection with their exercise

of their rights and obligations under any part of the CPS, Subscriber Agreement, and/or Relying Party Agreement, including use or access by any of Subscriber or Relying Party's users. Without limiting the foregoing, Subscribers and Relying Parties will comply with all applicable trade control laws, including but not limited to any sanctions or trade controls of the European Union ("E.U."), Canada, the United Kingdom ("U.K."), and United Nations ("U.N."); the Export Administration Regulations administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security; U.S. sanctions regulations administered by the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC"); or on the U.S. Department of Commerce Entities List ("Entities List"); and any import or export licenses required pursuant to any of the foregoing; and all applicable anti-money laundering laws, including the U.S. Bank Secrecy Act, Money Laundering Control Act, and Patriot Act, the Canadian Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, the U.K. Proceeds of Crime Act, and legislation implementing the International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism or the money laundering provisions of the U.N. transnational Organized Crime Convention. Each Subscriber and Relying Party represents and warrants that: (a) neither it nor any of its users is located in, under the control of, or a national or resident of any country to which the export of any software or technology licensed under the Agreement, or related information, would be prohibited by the applicable laws, rules or regulations of the U.S., Canada, U.K., E.U., or other applicable jurisdiction; (b) neither it nor any of its users is a Person to whom the export of any software or technology licensed under the Agreement, or related information, would be prohibited by the laws of the U.S., Canada, U.K., E.U., or other applicable jurisdiction; (c) it and each of its users has and will comply with applicable laws, rules and regulations of the U.S., Canada, U.K., E.U., or other applicable jurisdiction(s) and of any state, province, or locality or applicable jurisdiction governing exports of any product or service provided by or through Entrust; (d) it and all its users will not use any product or service for any purposes prohibited by applicable laws, rules or regulations on trade controls, including related to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons proliferation, arms trading, or in furtherance of terrorist financing; (e) neither it nor any of its users nor any of its affiliates, officers, directors, or employees is (i) an individual listed on, or directly or indirectly owned or controlled by, a Person (whether legal or natural) listed on, or acting on behalf of a Person listed on, any U.S, Canadian, E.U., U.K., or U.N. sanctions list, including OFAC's list of Specially Designated Nationals or the Entities List; or (ii) located in, incorporated under the laws of, or owned (meaning 50% or greater ownership interest) or otherwise, directly or indirectly, controlled by, or acting on behalf of, a person located in, residing in, or organized under the laws of any of the countries listed as Restricted Countries at <https://www.entrust.com/legal-compliance/sanctioned-countries> (each of (i) and (ii), a "Denied Party"); and (f) it and each of its users is legally distinct from, and not an agent of any Denied Party. In the event any of the above representations and warranties is incorrect or the Subscriber, Relying Party or any their users engages in any conduct that is contrary to sanctions or trade controls or other applicable laws, regulations, or rules, any agreements, purchase orders, performance of services, or other contractual obligations of Entrust are immediately terminated.

9.16 Miscellaneous Provisions

9.16.1 Entire Agreement

No stipulation.

9.16.2 Assignment

Certificates and the rights granted under the CPS, any Subscriber Agreement, or any Relying Party Agreement are personal to the Applicant, Subscriber, or Relying Party that entered into the Subscriber Agreement or Relying Party Agreement and cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, or otherwise disposed of, whether voluntarily, involuntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise, without the prior written consent of Entrust or the RA under a CA with which such Applicant, Subscriber, or Relying Party has contracted. Any attempted assignment or transfer without such consent shall be void and shall automatically terminate such Applicant's, Subscriber's or Relying Party's rights under the CPS, any Subscriber Agreement, or any Relying Party Agreement. Entrust may assign, sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of the CPS, any Subscriber Agreements, or any Relying Party Agreements together with all of its rights and obligations under the CPS, any Subscriber Agreements, and any Relying Party Agreements (i) to an Affiliate, or (ii) as part of a sale, merger, or other transfer of all or substantially all the assets or stock of the business of Entrust to which the CPS, the Subscriber Agreements, and Relying Party Agreements relate. Subject to the foregoing limits, this

Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of permitted successors and assigns of Entrust, any third-party RAs operating under the CAs, Applicants, Subscribers, and Relying Parties, as the case may be.

The CPS, the Subscriber Agreements, and the Relying Party Agreements state all of the rights and obligations of the Entrust Group, any Applicant, Subscriber, or Relying Party and any other persons, entities, or organizations in respect to the subject matter hereof and thereof and such rights and obligations shall not be augmented or derogated by any prior agreements, communications, or understandings of any nature whatsoever whether oral or written. The rights and obligations of the Entrust Group may not be modified or waived orally and may be modified only in a writing signed or authenticated by a duly authorized representative of Entrust.

9.16.3 Severability

To the extent permitted by applicable law, any provision of law is waived that would render any provision of the CPS, any Subscriber Agreements, and any Relying Party Agreements invalid or otherwise unenforceable in any respect. In the event that any provision of the CPS, any Subscriber Agreements, or any Relying Party Agreements is held to be invalid or otherwise unenforceable in application to particular facts or circumstances: (a) such provision will be interpreted and amended to the extent necessary to fulfill its intended purpose to the maximum extent permitted by applicable law and its validity and enforceability as applied to any other facts or circumstances will not be affected or impaired; and (b) the remaining provisions of the CPS, Subscriber Agreement, or Relying Party Agreement will continue in full force and effect. For greater certainty, it is expressly understood and intended that each provision that deals with limitations and exclusions of liability, disclaimers of representations, warranties and conditions, or indemnification is severable from any other provisions.

9.16.4 Enforcement

No stipulation.

9.16.5 Force Majeure

“Force Majeure Event” means any event or circumstance beyond Entrust Group’s reasonable control, including but not limited to, floods, fires, hurricanes, earthquakes, tornados, epidemics, pandemics, other acts of God or nature, strikes and other labor disputes, failure of utility, transportation or communications infrastructures, riots or other acts of civil disorder, acts of war, terrorism (including cyber terrorism), malicious damage, judicial action, lack of or inability to obtain export permits or approvals, acts of government such as expropriation, condemnation, embargo, changes in applicable laws or regulations, and shelter-in-place or similar orders, and acts or defaults of third party suppliers or service providers. In the event that a Force Majeure Event directly or indirectly causes a failure or delay in Entrust Group’s performance of its obligations under the CPS, any Subscriber Agreement, or any Relying Party Agreement, Entrust Group shall not be in default or liable for any loss or damages where performance is impossible or commercially impracticable.

9.17 Other Provisions

9.17.1 Conflict of Provisions

In the event of any conflict between the provisions of this CPS and the provisions of any Subscriber Agreement or any Relying Party Agreement, the terms and conditions of this CPS shall govern.

9.17.2 Fiduciary Relationships

Nothing contained in this CPS, or in any Subscriber Agreement, or any Relying Party Agreement shall be deemed to constitute the Entrust Group as the fiduciary, partner, agent, trustee, or legal representative of any Applicant, Subscriber, Relying Party or any other person, entity, or organization or to create any fiduciary relationship between the Entrust Group and any Subscriber, Applicant, Relying Party or any other person, entity, or organization, for any purpose whatsoever. Nothing in the CPS, or in any Subscriber Agreement or any Relying Party Agreement shall confer on any Subscriber, Applicant, Relying Party, or any other third

party, any authority to act for, bind, or create or assume any obligation or responsibility, or make any representation on behalf of the Entrust Group.

9.17.3 Waiver

The failure of Entrust to enforce, at any time, any of the provisions of this CPS, a Subscriber Agreement with Entrust, or a Relying Party Agreement with Entrust or the failure of Entrust to require, at any time, performance by any Applicant, Subscriber, Relying Party or any other person, entity, or organization of any of the provisions of this CPS, a Subscriber Agreement with Entrust, or a Relying Party Agreement with Entrust, shall in no way be construed to be a present or future waiver of such provisions, nor in any way affect the ability of Entrust to enforce each and every such provision thereafter. The express waiver by Entrust of any provision, condition, or requirement of this CPS, a Subscriber Agreement with Entrust, or a Relying Party Agreement with Entrust shall not constitute a waiver of any future obligation to comply with such provision, condition, or requirement.

9.17.4 Interpretation

All references in this CPS to “section” or “§” refer to the sections of this CPS unless otherwise stated. As used in this CPS, neutral pronouns and any variations thereof shall be deemed to include the feminine and masculine and all terms used in the singular shall be deemed to include the plural, and vice versa, as the context may require. The words “hereof”, “herein”, and “hereunder” and other words of similar import refer to this CPS as a whole, as the same may from time to time be amended or supplemented, and not to any subdivision contained in this CPS. The words “including”, “include” and “includes” will each be deemed to be followed by the phrase “without limitation”.